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ABSTRACT 
To aid system administrators in enforcing strict password policies, the use of 
password cracking tools such as Cisilia (C.I.S.l.ar, 2003) and John the Ripper (Solar 
Designer, 2002), have been employed as software utilities to look for "weak" 
passwords. John the Ripper (JtR) attempts to crack the passwords by using a 
dictionary, brute-force or "other" mode of attack. The computational intensity of 
cracking passwords has led to the utilisation of parallel-processing environments to 
increase the speed of the password-cracking task. Parallel-processing environments 
can consist of either single systems with multiple processors, or a collection of 
separate computers working together as a single, logical computer system; both of 
these configurations allow operations to run concurrently. 
This study aims to optimise and compare the execution of JtR on a pair of Beowulf 
clusters, which are a collection of computers configured to run in a parallel manner. 
Each of the clusters will run the Rocks cluster distribution, which is a Linux RedHat 
based cluster-toolkit. An implementation of the Message Passing Interface (MPI), 
MPICH, will be used for inter-node communication, allowing the password cracker to 
run in a parallel manner. 
Experiments were performed to test the reliability of cracking a single set of password 
samples on both a 32-bit and 64-bit Beowulf cluster comprised of Intel Pentium and 
AMD64 Opteron processors respectively. These experiments were also used to test 
the effectiveness of the brute-force attack against the dictionary attack of JtR. 
The results from this thesis may provide assistance to organisations in enforcing 
strong password policies on user accounts through the use of computer clusters and 
also to examine the possibility of using JtR as a tool to reliably measure password 
strength. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The use of passwords is widely accepted as a primary means of authentication on 
modem computer-systems, unfortunately reusable passwords have many flaws which 
may lead to the unauthorised access of private resources (lrakleous, Fumell, Dowland, 
& Papadaki, 2002; Neumann, 1994b; Pfleeger, 1997; SANS Institute, 2004; Wood, 
1996). While alternate means of authentication have been created to overcome the 
inherent flaws in reusable passwords such as biometrics or one-time passwords, these 
alternatives are, due to reasons of cost or complexity, far from becoming widely used 
(CSI, 2003; Harreld, 1999; Mortensen, 2001). 
A common method for attacking systems that use reusable passwords is the brute­
force attack, where the attacker tries every possible password combination until they 
stumble across the correct one. To strengthen passwords against brute-force attacks, 
users often have to use long passwords created from a random collection of characters 
not based off dictionary words. Ensuring that users create passwords that are 
sufficient in length, strength and complexity to dissuade brute-force attacks requires 
the use of both a policy on the construction and composition of passwords and a 
method of auditing and enforcing the said policy. 
Password cracking tools may be utilised in the enforcement of password policies, by 
cracking the passwords legitimately to discover which passwords are easily cracked, 
and therefore susceptible to attack. In order to crack a password the software must try 
thousands or millions of possible password combinations in order to find a correct 
match. As there are approximately 3 trillion unique, 8 character passwords comprised 
from just alphabetic and numeric characters, if a single computer could crack 160,000 
passwords a second it would take approximately 217 days to attempt every possible 
password combination. Given that this time would increase for passwords of a larger 
size, very few system administrators would consider such an option feasible and may 
be tempted to only run an attack for a limited time. While this is possible some weak 
passwords that would have otherwise been detected might not be found. 
Through the use of a computing cluster the time taken to run a complete attack would 
be reduced considerably, perhaps to the point where a full attack would be a feasible 
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option. This research aims to compare the optimisation of a password cracking utility 
on a cluster of 64-bit Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) Opteron computers against a 
cluster of 32-bit Intel computers. The experiments and research may be significant to 
industries that rely on the strength of user-defined reusable passwords to secure 
sensitive information. The findings may also provide businesses with an alternative 
use for superseded or aging computer systems, other than retirement. In some cases, 
these systems may be brought back to life and re-used for the business, instead of 
having to be sold or disposed of. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
2. 1 Passwords as a Means of Authentication 
2.1.1 Forms of Authentication 
It is a generally accepted truism that there are three main types of computer and 
network authentication: things that you know, such as passwords or Personal 
Identification Numbers (PIN); things that you are, biometrics; and things that you 
have, such as a USB-dongle or pass-card (Liu & Silverman, 2000). It is not 
uncommon to see hybrid authentication technologies such as a USB-dongle which 
contains a thumbprint scanner, but also requires the use of a password. 
In Neumann's (1994a, p.2) paper on the Risks of Passwords, the use of one-time 
passwords is discussed as an alternative means of authentication. One-time 
passwords, sometimes called challenge-response systems, usually rely on 
mathematical functions to provide unique passwords for every authentication 
(Pfleeger, 1997, p. 262). This method of authentication still relies on 'something you 
have' and possibly 'something you know', for example a smart-card which may store 
one-time, unique tokens but also requires the use of a PIN (Neumann, 1994a). 
Such methods of computer and network authentication are not always reliable. Using 
the aforementioned example of the smart card such a device may easily be lost or 
copied, a password may be discovered by someone eavesdropping, and fingerprint or 
face scanners might report high rates of false rejection or false acceptance. Other 
problems stem from the cost and interoperability of biometric devices, especially with 
the lack of a mature, universal biometric standard. Until these problems are overcome 
and prices for hardware authentication devices drop such systems will remain in the 
minority (CSI, 2003; Harreld, 1999; Mortensen, 2001). 
In an attempt to address these issues Neumann (1994a) outlines a set of idealised 
requirements for secure authentication which are applicable not only to one-time 
passwords, but to any form of computer based authentication. These requirements 
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include user authenticity and non-repudiation, ease of use, device/system integrity and 
availability, network integrity, and system accountability. 
2.1.2 Prevalence of Password Authentication 
Even though passwords are susceptible to a range of different attacks, the use of 
passwords as a means of authentication is still the primary way to access computer 
resources (lrakleous et al., 2002; Wood, 1996). In a comparison of different secret­
based authentication methods, Irakleous et al., (2002, p.8) found that the known and 
familiar methods of passwords and PINs were favoured. This implies that password 
policies and enforcement mechanisms are important for successfully securing systems 
that rely on passwords for authentication. Alternative methods of authentication that 
were tested included cognitive questions and answers, associative questions and 
answers, and a graphical authentication approach. 
Wood ( 1996, p.1) asserts that the prevalence of passwords as a means of 
authentication results from the relative low-cost to businesses and their high 
acceptability to users. lrakleous et al (2002, p.2) echoes these findings asserting 
reasons of conceptual simplicity for both systems designers and end users. According 
to the 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (CSI, 2003), the number of 
systems relying on reusable passwords has increased by three percent from the 
previous year. 
Such findings combined with the slow take-up of biometrics (ibid, 2003), indicate that 
replacement authentication methods are still a long way from supplanting password 
authentication. Furthermore, while passwords remain dominant, password policies, 
and their enforcement will also remain an important factor in securing computer 
systems. 
2.1.3 Password Policies 
Often organisations will utilise a password policy to educate users to the importance 
of passwords. To assist in the construction of effective passwords the policy usually 
outlines rules for 'strong' passwords, the correct use of passwords and how frequently 
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users' passwords should be modified. The SysAdmin, Audit, Network and Security 
(SANS) Institute (2004, p.1) provides a template password policy which details 
general policy content. 
The template policy suggests the following password creation guidelines: 
• [Passwords should] Contain both upper and lower case characters (e.g., 
a-z, A-Z) 
• [Passwords should] Have digits and punctuation characters as well as 
letters e.g., 0-9, ! @#$%"&*()_+I--=\' } { [] : " ;'<>?,./) 
• [Passwords should be] At least eight alphanumeric characters long. 
• [Passwords should not be] A word in any language, slang, dialect, 
jargon, etc. 
• [Passwords should not be] Based on personal information, names of 
family, etc. 
• Passwords should never be written down or stored on-line. 
• Try to create passwords that can be easily remembered. One way to do 
this is create a password based on a song title, affirmation, or other 
phrase. For example, the phrase might be: "This May Be One Way To 
Remember" and the password could be: "TmBlw2R! "  or "TmblW>r-" 
or some other variation. 
• Passwords must be changed at least once a quarter 
• Passwords must not be inserted into email messages 
(ibid, 2004, p.1) 
In addition to strong password characteristics, the Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) (1985) provides a list of properties which may help define the 
guidelines for a strong password as shown in Table 2.1. 
5 
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Table 2.1 Properties of Passwords in a Computer or Network Environment 
Composition The set of acceptable characters which maybe be used in a valid password 
Length range The set of acceptable lengths of passwords, expressed as a minimum length 
through a maximum length (e.g., 4-8), i.e., all the acceptable number of 
characters in a valid password 
Lifetime The maximum acceptable period of time for which a password is valid 
Source The set of acceptable entities which can create or select a valid password 
from among all acceptable passwords 
Ownership The set of individuals who are authorised to use a password 
Distribution The set of acceptable methods for providing (transporting) a new password to 
its owner and to all places where it will be needed in the password system 
Storage The set of acceptable methods of storing a valid password during its lifetime 
Entry The set of acceptable methods by which a password may be entered by a user 
for authentication or authorisation purposes 
Transmission The set of acceptable methods for communicating a password from its point 
of entry to its point of comparison with a stored, valid password 
Authentication period The maximum acceptable period between any initial authentication process 
and subsequent re-authentication processes during a single terminal session 
or during the period data is being accessed 
(Federal Information Processing Standards, 1985) 
However, neither the FIPS nor the SANS Institute define a metric for 
determining the strength of a password. Without a standard metric, assumptions 
will have to be made based on password length, character composition, and the 
use of dictionary-based words. Unfortunately many of these factors are 
restricted by the operating system. For example, the Microsoft Windows LAN 
Manager (LANMAN) passwords are truncated or padded to 14 characters long 
and all characters are transformed to upper case before they are encrypted for 
storage (Cox & Hill, 2001). 
By themselves, password policies are inadequate to ensure the security of 
password authentication. According to Adams & Sasse (1999) without a method 
of policy enforcement users will eventually start ignoring the password policy 
utilised by their organisation. There are tools available to system administrators 
to enforce password policies, such as software that helps users in choosing new 
6 
Optimising John the Ripper for a Clustered Environment Christian Frichot 
passwords by providing some example passwords or requires the user to enter a 
new password every few logins. 
It is also common for modern operating systems to have in-built password 
policy mechanisms. For example both Novell and Microsoft provide group 
policies to control password use options (Microsoft, 2002; Novell, 2004). Such 
options only ensure that passwords do not contain any part of the account's 
username and they must contain a mixture of upper-case, lower-case, numeric 
or symbol characters which does not necessarily guarantee a 'strong' password 
(Microsoft, 2004). Password cracking tools such as John the Ripper, overcome 
the problem of password policy enforcement as they are executed by system 
administrators after the users' passwords are encrypted and in place, advising 
the administrator which user accounts have easily cracked passwords, and 
which do not. 
2.2 Breaking Passwords 
2.2.1 Attacking reusable passwords 
Passwords are seen as the first and usually only line of defence for computer systems 
(SANS Institute, 2004; Wood, 1996). Once an attacker has forged an identity and 
provided valid authentication within a computer system there is typically nothing else 
to stop them from exploring the environment, and possibly escalating their user 
privileges. As previously discussed, reusable passwords may seem convenient but are 
very susceptible to a range of attacks (Neumann, 1994b, p.1). Neumann suggests the 
following categorisation of different password attack methods detailed in Table 2.2 
that were later extended by Pfleeger in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.2 Password Attack Methods 
Exhaustive Attacks Attempting passwords by random trial and error 
Educated guessing of passwords The use of default passwords, dictionary based words, or 
passwords which have a logical association with a particular user 
Deriving passwords (Dictionary) Pre-emptive dictionary attacks 
Capturing unencrypted passwords Capturing passwords by Trojan horses or other snooping 
techniques 
Creating bogus passwords and Capturing passwords through a custom login method, or inserting 
trapdoors entries into insecure password files 
Bypassing authentication Using exploits in different parts of the system to access higher-
level constructs 
(Neumann, 1994b, p. l) 
Table 2.3 Password Attack Methods Extended 
Brute force attacks Similar to exhaustive attacks, but instead of using random trial 
and error the cracking mode tries all possible passwords. 
Probable passwords Using characteristics of password selection to choose words more 
probable to be in a password 
Asking the user The use of social engineering to get a user to share their password 
with you 
(Pfleeger, 1997, p.256) 
Of the methods described in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, the brute force and dictionary attacks 
are seen as the more popular automated methods from their wide use in popular 
password cracking tools (ATStake, 2002; C.I.S.l.ar, 2003; Cooke, Larson, Springle, & 
St Denis, 2004; d4b0rg, 2001; Solar Designer, 2002). Given sufficient computational 
power and time, these two methods alone are able to re-create every possible 
password combination. Utilities such as John the Ripper combine multiple methods of 
attack such as an attack based on user details followed by a dictionary attack and 
concluding with a brute-force attack (Solar Designer, 2002). 
Passwords are not only vulnerable to direct attack methods but have other inherent 
weaknesses such as the handling of passwords by end-users, or even in the storage 
and movement of passwords. Wood (1997, p. l)  asserts that passwords should be 
protected from unauthorised disclosure whether they are stored on a floppy disk, 
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written down or spoken into a voice recognition unit. Unfortunately factors like these 
are outside the realm of technological enforcement, especially where end-users have 
access to multiple systems, and with the blind trust many organisations place in their 
end-users (ibid, 1997). 
Many of the attack methods listed in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 may be thwarted by placing 
locking mechanisms on the authentication system which will lock the system after a 
number of unsuccessful attempts (Schneier, 2000, p. 140). Unfortunately, if an 
attacker obtains the password file, whether or not it is encrypted, there is no method of 
preventing the discovery of some, if not all, of the passwords. 
An attacker performing an online attack is likely to be discovered much earlier than 
an attacker performing an offline attack (Tuesday, 2003, p.2). This is due to the ease 
of performing an attack on a password file locally at your own discretion compared to 
connecting multiple times to an online system as the additional traffic might be 
noticed and the connection speeds will be slower. 
Using the previously discussed cracking methods to legitimately break password files 
before an attacker has the opportunity allows administrators to audit passwords. Such 
a method of password checking might be very effective on systems with a high 
number of users. For example, Klein's (1990) experimental research into the problems 
of password security included the cracking of a database with nearly 15,000 entries. 
After the first 15 minutes, 2.7 percent of the database was cracked, and at the end of 
the first week, 21 percent had been cracked. 
2.2.2 The Human Factor 
As previously mentioned, not all problems with password authentication stem from 
technological issues; in fact, many authors (lrakleous et al. , 2002; Jobusch & 
Oldehoeft, 1989; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Schneier, 2000) attribute most of the 
weaknesses associated with password authentication to user problems. Adams & 
Sasse (1999) proffer that many attackers pay more attention to the human-side of 
authentication preferring the use of social-engineering to obtain login credentials from 
users rather than attempting to crack the system. Schneier's Secrets & Lies (2000, 
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p. 139) and Mitnick's The Art of Deception (2002, p. 63) highlight that even when 
users choose strong passwords, they are too easily persuaded to share their password 
with other users and even occasionally with people from outside the organisation. 
In the survey carried out by Adams & Sasse ( 1999) regarding the behaviours and 
perceptions of users relating to password systems, it was found that over half of the 
139 respondents wrote their passwords down in one form or another. However, the 
research concluded that the problem did not lie in end-users or in password policies, 
but in the lack of communication between security staff and users. This failure in 
communication often resulted in users being unaware of the constitution of strong 
passwords and utilised their own rules of password composition leading to weaker 
passwords. 
Password-strength enforcing mechanisms such as those provided by password 
crackers may be configured to notify users of weak passwords, but a notification of a 
weak password alone does not educate users on the construction of a strong password. 
Wood ( 1996) recommends the use of on-screen messages to advise users that weak 
passwords may impact the security of their systems, and to further provide rules for 
the creation of stronger passwords. These mechanisms, if used correctly, will notify 
users of a weak password, and hopefully encourage the creation of a new stronger 
password (Adams & Sasse, 1 999; Schneier, 2000; Wood, 1 996). This solution alone 
still fails to completely secure passwords as a means of authentication; if even a single 
account is compromised an attacker has the opportunity to explore the system for 
other ways to escalate their privileges. 
Issues also arise in situations where a user is forced to choose their own password on 
multiple systems. Adams and Sasse' s ( 1999) survey reported that many users used a 
single common password on multiple systems introducing increased risks to the 
password secured systems. For example, Schneier (2000, p. 139) discusses a method 
of setting up a false website that requires users to register their own usemame and 
password as a means of harvesting authentication details. This attack is known as 
"phishing", and is more commonly associated with issues of online bank fraud or 
identity theft (Orla, 2003; Reid, 2003), but may easily be used as a technique to 
acquire users' passwords on other systems. 
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2.2.3 The Technology of Password Systems 
The password authentication of a user on a computer system requires the following 
steps (Pfleeger, 1997, p. 255; Schneier, 2000, p. 136): 
1. The user enters some piece of identification, such as a username or user ID. 
2. The system retrieves a password from a data store, typically an encrypted file. 
3. If the password entered matches the password kept on file by the system then 
the user is authenticated. 
4. If the password does not match, the user may have mistyped their password. 
Most systems will ask for the password again. 
In the case of UNIX based operating systems, the password file is usually stored in 
the /etc/passwd file. This file typically contains the information as shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 The /etc/passwd File 
Usemame 
Encrypted 
Password 
This field identifies the user to the system. It is primarily Chare 
for human benefit. They must be unique on a given rceh 
machine and, ideally, unique within an organisation. brb 
markd 
This field contains, or can contain, the encrypted U7mHuh5R4UmVo 
password. x 
* 
NOLOGIN 
UID This is the numerical representation of the user on the O - 60,000 
system. 
GID This is the numerical representation of the login group O - 60,000 
that the user belongs to. 
Home Directory This is the directory where the user is placed upon login. /u/chare 
/usr/lib/ppp 
/ppp-users 
Login Shell This is the login shell that is started for users to enable /bin/sh 
them to interact with the system. /bin/csh 
/bin/ksh 
(Hare & Siyan, 1996, p. 65-66) 
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To ensure that plain-text passwords are not stored within a system, passwords are 
stored in an encrypted form. These encrypted passwords are computed via a one-way 
function (Pfleeger, 1997, p. 259) that converts any input text into an irreversible 
cipher-text string of a fixed length. To verify authentication the user' s input, plain-text 
password is computed through the same one-way function and then compared to the 
stored encrypted value. To facilitate login, this file must be world-readable, which 
immediately means that anyone can view the contents, which include the encrypted 
passwords. To prevent this, encrypted passwords are typically stored in a password 
file with limited access, similar to the /etc/passwd file, except that instead of 
containing user information it only holds the encrypted password and password aging 
details. This file is more secure than the /etc/passwd file because it is only readable by 
the administrator of the system (Hare & Siyan, 1996, p. 67; Schneier, 2000, p. 140). 
The Windows equivalent of the shadow file is the Security Accounts Management 
(SAM) database file, which is further encrypted with a locally stored encryption key 
(Microsoft, 2003). Unfortunately having both the SAM file and the encryption key to 
the SAM file on the same system means that anyone with local access to the machine 
automatically has access to the contents of the SAM file. 
The steps used by systems to authenticate users are also not without flaws, Lobels' 
(2000) report on strengthening user authentication highlights some of the methods in 
which the authentication process may be jeopardised. Examples included keystroke 
monitoring, network monitoring, and man-in-the-middle attacks. While password 
crackers may not guard against these attacks directly, they make it difficult for 
attackers utilising these methods to discover additional usernames and passwords as 
the weak passwords will have already been disabled or changed. 
2.2.4 One-Way Hashing 
One-way hashing relies on functions which are relatively easy to compute but 
significantly harder to reverse (Schneier, 1996, p. 29). These functions utilise 
mathematical equations that receive an input string or message of any length, the pre­
image, and then convert it into a smaller fixed-length output string. This output string 
is known as the hash value or just the hash. 
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One-way hashing algorithms have the following main characteristics: 
1. Given a message, it is easy to compute the hash of that message 
2.  Given the hash of a message, it is hard to compute the original message 
3. Given a message, it is hard to find another message such that the hash of the 
first and second messages are the same, known as a collision 
(Schneier, 1996, p. 429) 
Another characteristic is collision-resistance which states that it is hard to find two 
random messages, that when hashed return the same output (Menezes, Van Oorschot, 
& Vanstone, 1997, p. 324). This differs slightly from the third characteristic listed 
above as it is directed at finding a collision of two random messages instead of a 
known message. 
One of the main features of a one-way hashing algorithm is its compression function 
that allows an arbitrary-length input to be converted into a pre-defined length output. 
The compression function takes both the next block of the message and the hashed 
output from previous blocks as input, producing a hash value for the next round of 
compression or if at the end of the message, the final hash value. Compression 
functions also produce what is known as the avalanche effect, where changes in 
earlier message blocks will cascade through to the final hash (Brennen, 2004). 
To allow a hashing algorithm to output a fixed-length hash from an input value which 
may be smaller than the size of the message blocks an Initialisation Variable (IV) is 
used. (Shin, Rhee, & Yoon, 1999). By using IVs it is possible to create a fixed length 
hash from a short string of characters, such as "ABC" up to an entire hard drive 
image. An example of such a compression function is detailed in Figure 2.1. 
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Message Block 1 
Initial Variable � 
Compression 
Function 
Message Block 2 
Compression 
Function 
Figure 2.1 Compression Function 
Christian Frichot 
Message Block N Padding 
Hash Result 
(Robshaw, 1996) 
Attacks against one-way hashing algorithms involve trying to create new messages 
that return the same hash as previous messages, or trying to discover two random 
messages that return equivalent hashes. The first attack is such that given the hash of a 
message; an attacker would be able to create another message that would create an 
identical hash. This would allow the attacker to create a message which would appear 
to be authentic according to the hash when it is in fact forged. The second attack 
occurs if an attacker tries to find two different messages that create identical hashes. 
While this attack does not give an attacker a method of forging messages it is still 
breaking one of the characteristics of a hashing algorithm, which may lead to the 
discovery of other flaws. The latter style attack is commonly known as a birthday 
attack and is much easier than the first method due to the statistical based birthday 
paradox (Schneier, 1996, p. 1 65), which states: 
• There has to be at least 253 people in a room for there to be a 50% or greater 
chance that someone in that room will have the same birthday as you, this is 
similar to the first attack. 
• There has to only be at least 23 people in a room for there to be a 50% or 
greater chance that at least 2 of those people will share the same birthday, this 
is similar to the second attack. 
Schneier ( 1996, p. 430) offers an example of how a user, Alice, could use the birthday 
attack to take advantage of another user, Bob: 
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1. Alice prepares two versions of a contract: one is favourable to Bob; the other 
bankrupts him. 
2. Alice makes several subtle changes to each document and calculates the hash 
value for each. With enough subtle changes these documents, while retaining 
the same semantic meanings, will return different hash values. 
3. Alice compares the hash values for each change in each of the two documents, 
looking for a pair that matches. She reconstructs the two documents that hash 
to the same value. 
4. Alice has Bob sign the version of the contract that is favourable to him, using 
a protocol in which he only signs the hash value. 
5 .  At some time in the future, Alice substitutes the contract Bob signed with the 
one that he did not. Now she can convince an adjudicator that Bob signed the 
other contract. 
Other attacks against one-way hashing algorithms include pseudo-collision attacks 
and compression function attacks. Both of these methods examine the feasibility of 
attacks on slightly modified versions of the hash function (Menezes et al., 1997, p. 
371). Even though problems found this way are not direct weaknesses they are still 
able to cast suspicion on the security of the algorithm (ibid, 1997, p. 371 ). 
Some common one-way hashing algorithms used today are based on the Message 
Digest (MD4) algorithm which was originally designed by Ron Rivest in 1990 
(Menezes et al., 1997, p. 343). The MD4 algorithm produces a 128-bit hash and was 
designed to be secure, fast, simple and favourable to 32-bit Intel based computing 
hardware (Rivest, 1990). Soon after its creation parts of the algorithm were 
successfully broken by Bert den Boer, Antoon Bosselaers and Ralph Merkle 
(Schneier, 1996, p. 436). 
This led Rivest to design the MD5 128-bit hash algorithm which added an extra round 
of computation and modified the core functions of the MD4 algorithm (Rivest, 1992). 
This increased the security of the algorithm by diminishing the likelihood of collisions 
in the output hashes. Soon after its release, Bert den Boer and Antoon Bosselaers 
successfully produced collisions in the compression function of MD5 by using an 
identical message and two separate sets of initialisation variables (Schneier, 1996, p. 
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441 ). In 1996, Dobbertin found another collision when using two different messages 
and pre-defined initialisation variables (Dobbertin, 1996; Robshaw, 1996). These 
attacks are limited to the compression functions used within the algorithm and not the 
overall hashing functionality and are therefore not viewed as crippling to the 
algorithm. 
In August 2004, Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo Feng, Xuejia Lai and Hongbo Yu (2004) 
successfully found two separate messages which returned identical hashes when 
computed with the MD5 algorithm. Even though this collision breaks one of the 
characteristics of what makes it a one-way hashing algorithm, the pragmatic use of 
this attack is quite limited. Unfortunately, the same methods that were utilised to find 
this collision may be used to find more collisions which will lead to the MD5 
algorithms phasing out. 
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), which was later revised to SHA-1 ,  is another one­
way hashing algorithm that stems from the original MD4 algorithm. The SHA- 1 
algorithm differed from MD4 by outputting a 1 60-bit hash, instead of 128-bits; the 
use of 5 initialisation variables, instead of 4; an extra compression function; and the 
reuse of previous results for a faster avalanche effect (Menezes et al., 1997, p. 348). 
In 2001 ,  3 more hash functions based off SHA were proposed, known as SHA-256, 
SHA-384, SHA-5 12. These iterative hash functions output 256-bit, 384-bit and 5 12-
bit hashes respectively (Stinson, 2002, p. 136). 
Even though not strictly a one-way hashing algorithm the DES algorithm developed 
in the 1970s may be used to create cipher-text representations of plaintext passwords. 
The DES algorithm is a symmetric 64-bit block cipher, that takes a 64-bit block of 
plaintext and outputs a 64-bit block of cipher-text, where the strength of encryption 
lies in the key used for encryption and decryption (Federal Information Processing 
Standards, 1988; Schneier, 1996). The Microsoft LANMAN format of passwords uses 
the DES algorithm to encrypt users' passwords. To accomplish this, the LANMAN 
algorithm firstly truncates or pads the users' password to 14 characters, and then uses 
each seven character half as the key to encrypt a constant 64-bit plaintext block (Cox 
& Hill, 2001 ). This is shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Upper Case Password 
Keys: 7 Bytes 
Constant DES 
DES 
8 Bytes 
16  Byte LANMAN Hash 
(Cox & Hill, 2001 )  
Figure 2.2 LANMAN Password Algorithm 
2.2.5 Password Cracking Tools 
Crack is a UNIX based password cracking tool written by Alec Muffet ( 199 1 )  
designed to crack passwords stored on most earlier UNIX based operating systems. 
These systems such as BSD, Ultrix and Linux, rely on the crypt() function to create 
cipher-text passwords. Crack uses dictionary files and password files as input to a 
rules-based filter to create a larger list of password guesses. These guesses are then 
stored and ordered directly into memory before being compared against the password 
file entries. Any successful guesses are then marked as complete and are no longer 
tested. Due to the storage of the modified and permuted password guesses in memory 
Crack may consume an inordinate amount of system resources. To counter this, after a 
dictionary file has been modified and compared to the password file it is flushed from 
memory before the next dictionary file is loaded. 
John the Ripper, designed by Solar Designer (2002), is a password cracker that may 
be used on multiple platforms, to crack multiple password types. John the Ripper 
supports the following ciphertext formats: standard and double-length DES, BSDI's 
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extended DES, FreeBSD's MD5, and OpenBSD's Blowfish (ibid, 2002). John the 
Ripper also has the ability to not only perform dictionary-attacks, but also brute-force 
attacks and user-defined methods of attack. 
LC4, or LOphtcrack, by @Stake (2002) is a Windows based password cracking and 
recovery tool for Microsoft Windows NT passwords. LOphtcrack can use three 
different methods of attack: dictionary, brute-force or a hybrid mode. The latest 
version also offers the ability to run in a parallel manner, and software wizards to help 
in auditing passwords that are cracked. 
2.3 Clustered Computing 
2.3.1 Background 
A cluster of computers is a collection of several computers, connected via a common 
communications network, working together to combine their computational power 
(Dinquel, 2000; Ng & Rogers, 2000). Compute clusters arose from the need of 
researchers to perform parallel tasks that normally rely on the use of supercomputers, 
unfortunately for researchers, the extreme optimisation and level of performance that 
these super-computers require make them very expensive. Compute clusters are aimed 
at the middle of the computing spectrum, with personal desktop computers on one end 
and supercomputers on the other. Dinquel (2000, p.1) highlights that the goal of 
clustering is to achieve a near-supercomputing performance at personal computer 
pnces. 
Another way to classify a cluster of computers is by examining Sterling's (2002) 
taxonomy of parallel computing. Instead of placing clusters in the realm somewhere 
between desktop computers and supercomputers, this categorisation defines a cluster 
of computers relative to other parallel computing architectures. Sterling's taxonomy 
of parallel computing can be seen in Table 2.5 where clusters are an alternative to 
medium and high-end scalable computing systems. In many cases, this is often a 
replacement for older monolithic supercomputers. 
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Table 2.5 Taxonomy of Parallel Computing Environments 
Systolic computers Special-purpose, hard-wired implementations of parallel 
algorithms 
Vector computers Exploit fine-grained, vector operations. The basis for the original 
Cray supercomputers 
Single instruction, multiple data Exploits fine-grained data parallelism by having many small 
(SIMD) architectures processors perform the same operation synchronously on separate 
data 
Dataflow models Used fine-grained, asynchronous flow controls which relied on 
data precedence constraints to provide dynamic, adaptive 
scheduling mechanisms 
Processor in memory (PIM) Merging memory with processing logic to create diverse arrays of 
architectures devices 
Massively parallel processors Use off-the-shelf processors and memory in custom designed 
(MPPs) node boards. These machines range from distributed-memory 
machines to shared memory machines 
Clusters An ensemble of off-the-shelf computers integrated by a network 
Distributed computing Combines the computing power of numerous, widely sepa�ated 
computers via the internet 
(Sterling, 2002, p.25) 
2.3.2 Beowulf Clusters 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) High Performance 
Computing and Communication (HPCC) Earth and Space sciences project sponsored 
the Beowulf project in 1994. By 1996 the HPCC announced a Beowulf system 
exceeding the Gigaflops ( a billion floating-point computer operations per second) 
level of performance for under US$50,000 (Ridge, Becker, Merkey, & Sterling, 
1997). The Beowulf configuration was initially designed from what was known as the 
Pile-of-PCs (PoPC) model, which described a grouping of computers applied together 
to a single problem. 
The emphasis of the PoPC model was the use of mass-market components, using 
dedicated processors instead of idle workstations and utilising private networks. The 
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goal of the PoPC model was to achieve the best system cost versus performance ratio 
(Ridge et al., 1997). Beowulf extended the PoPC model by emphasizing: 
• No custom components, allowing for flexibility 
• Easy replication from multiple vendors 
• Scalable input/output 
• A freely available software base 
• Using freely available distribution computing tools with minimal changes 
• Returning the design and improvements to the community 
(ibid, 1997, p.3) 
Sterling (2002) expounds the advantages of Beowulf clusters highlighting the 
convergence of commodity and Beowulf clusters as the standard in parallel computing 
structures; their high availability, achieved through the use of multiple, redundant, 
identical resources; personal empowerment, which is related to their flexibility; and 
their development cost and time. 
2.3.3 The Message Passing Interface 
Even though a Beowulf cluster can be used to undertake certain problems without 
inter-node communication, to be able to tackle large problems involving complex 
structures it is often necessary for the cluster to have the ability to provide inter-node 
communication. One of the standard approaches to this problem, known as message 
passing, is to allow for the nodes to pass messages between each other (Sterling, 
2002). 
The Message Passing Interface (MPI), a specification of the message passing 
paradigm was initially proposed in 1992 (Gropp & Lusk, 2004a). During the 
specification design an implementation was built known as MPICH (Gropp & Lusk, 
2004b ), which allowed quick feedback on different aspects of the specification. 
MPICH is a C, C++, and Fortran library that provides message passing functions that 
can be implemented in programs to make them work in parallel. MPICH not only 
works for Beowulf clusters, but also for shared-memory architectures and other 
parallel computing environments. MPICH also has support for both Single Program 
Multiple Data (SPMD) and Multiple Program Multiple Data (MPMD) applications, 
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which allows programs that use the MPICH implementation of MPI to be flexible and 
portable (ibid, 2004b ). 
MPICH provides different ways for compute node communication by allowing 
definitions of groups and communicators. Within these groupings, each node is 
assigned a unique node ID that allows for direct node-to-node messages or group 
specific messages. Some of the more standard function calls provided by the MPICH 
libraries include: MPI_send(), to send a message to a different node; MPI_receive(), 
to receive a message from a different node; and MPI_bcast(), to send a message to a 
group of nodes (ibid, 2004b). 
2.3.4 Previous Clustered Password Cracking Solutions 
John the Ripper-MP! is a modified implementation of John the Ripper by Lim (2004) 
allowing John the Ripper to perform its brute-force attack using multiple computers in 
a distributed fashion. Each computer determines which keyspace to crack dependant 
on its position in the cluster. Because each node works independently of each other 
John the Ripper-MP! does not suffer from network bandwidth bottlenecks when 
running a brute-force attack. 
Cisilia is a multi-process, cracking utility, designed to crack Microsoft Windows 
NT/2000/XP and Samba passwords in a parallel manner. Cisilia is developed by the 
Center of Investigation Security Information Argentina (C.I.S.I.ar, 2003) research 
group, and uses brute-force attacks to crack passwords. When executed on a load­
balancing cluster of computers, Cisilia has the ability to create multiple processes, 
migrating to the different computers to work in parallel. 
Distributed, Keyboard, Brute-Force (DKBF) is a Microsoft Windows NT password 
cracking tool designed to work on Linux clusters using MPI to distribute the work 
(d4b0rg, 2001). DKBF is a distributed version of LOphtcrack (ATStake, 2002), which 
can only perform the brute-force attack. This tool works in a similar way to John the 
Ripper-MP!, but is only able to brute-force attack Microsoft Windows NT LAN 
manger, or NT Hashed passwords. 
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2.3.5 Implications of a 64-bit Architecture 
To facilitate this research the cluster consists of a homogenous collection of 
Advanced Micro Device (AMD) Opteron systems (AMD, 2004b). AMD Opterons are 
64-bit processors based on the AMD x86-64 architecture. The differences between 
32-bit, x86 processors, such as Intel' s  Pentium 4 (Intel Corporation, 2004) or AMD's 
Athlon XP (AMD, 2004a), and the 64-bit AMD Opteron include: 
• Additional general purpose registers 
• Widening of the general purpose registers to 64 bits 
• Additional 128-bit media registers 
• An increase of the virtual address range to 64 bits 
• A flat address space, allowing more than 4 Gigabytes (GB) of addressable 
memory 
• An integrated memory controller, allowing direct processor to memory 
communication 
• Dedicated communication channels between Symmetrical Multiple Processors 
(SMP), or other input devices (HyperTransport) 
(AMD, 2003; Kaplowitz, 2003; Matzan, 2003) 
The 64-bit architecture may offer the following benefits over a standard 32-bit 
architecture: 
1. An increase of the virtual address range and a flat address space, allowing 
software to now access more than 4 GB of memory. 
2. Faster access to memory, because of the integrated memory controller. 
3. The ability to perform operations on 64-bit numbers instead of having to split 
them down to 32-bit. 
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3.0 Research Questions 
1. Which is the more efficient method of cracking a sample of passwords on a 
cluster of computers running John the Ripper, a brute-force attack or a 
dictionary attack? 
2. Is there an increase in the efficiency of password cracking on a cluster of 
computers if John the Ripper is compiled and run on a 64-bit system compared 
to a 32-bit system? 
3. Can John the Ripper be used to reliably measure password strength? 
4.0 Research Methodology 
4. 1 Epistemology 
The branch of philosophy known as epistemology is dedicated to the study of the 
nature of knowledge, its sources, varieties and limits (Clarke, 2001; Philosophical 
Society, n.d.). The two dominant, competing views are empiricism and rationalism. 
Empiricism is the school of thought that believes that all knowledge is derived from 
experience, either by direct observation or by experimentation (Philosophical Society, 
n.d.). Rationalism, or apriorism, believes that knowledge is acquired through reason 
and intuition, independently of experience (ibid, n.d.). Positivism is an extreme form 
of empiricism which believes that nothing is innate and knowledge is only acquired 
by things which can be measured (Clarke, 2001). 
4.2 Research Design 
Hopkins (2000) outlines two types of studies aimed at quantifiable research: 
descriptive studies and experimental studies. A descriptive study, otherwise known as 
an observational study, is a type of study where the researcher does not intervene with 
the subjects. The researcher, in an instance of a descriptive study, takes on the role of 
an observer. In contrast, an experimental study allows the researcher to be active with 
the subjects, allowing a certain degree of intervention. Due to the research requiring 
intervention between the researcher and the subjects, such as the direct m�ipulations, 
control groups, experimental methods will be used to answer the research questions. 
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Tanner (cited in Williamson, 2002) outlines three main types of experimental research 
designs, the true experiment, quasi-experiment and pre-experiment. The true 
experiment is defined to be the most suitable experimental method in testing 
hypotheses which are involved with cause-and-effect relationships (Williamson, 
2002). In its simplest form, the experimental model involves subjects that are 
randomly assigned to groups that either experience a condition, or do not. Due to the 
rigorous controls that are used to minimise rival explanations, true experiments have a 
strong internal validity, in that the effects that are measured will be caused by the 
experiment, not external factors. Unfortunately, because of these tight controls, the 
causality is not always guaranteed outside the experiment, leading to a weak external 
validity, where the experiment cannot be reliably reproduced in the real world (ibid, 
2002). 
Pre-experimental designs do not use either controlled conditions or randomisation and 
are therefore usually viewed as methodologically weak (ibid, 2002). An example of 
the simplest form of a pre-experiment is the one-group pretest-posttest design, where 
a group is tested, exposed to a treatment, then tested again (Abrahams, 1996). Due to 
the lack of control employed by this method of experimentation and also its non­
random method of acquiring samples, pre-experiments lack both internal validity and 
external validity. 
Quasi-experimental research designs are the compromise between true experiments 
and pre-experiments. In a quasi-experiment, the groups used are formed by non­
random methods (Williamson, 2002), which means the samples are not a true 
representation of the population. Due to quasi-experiments lack of truly random 
samples, they are only able to infer or hint at causal relationships, not to prove 
causality. (ibid, 2002). 
4.3 The Methodology Used for this Research 
The researcher believes that the positivist epistemology will be the most effective 
approach to address the research questions, as the knowledge needed to answer the 
research questions will be acquired through experimentation and observations. The 
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quasi-experimental research design will be employed to gather data for further 
quantitative analysis. A true experimental design will not be used because of the lack 
of real password samples. Without real password samples, random number generators 
and automatic password generators will be used to create password samples to 
represent the total population of passwords. To categorise the samples into groups of 
differing strength, each sample will be given a password-strength value according to a 
pre-defined metric, measured by the length and composition of each password. 
Statistical analysis of the results will be used to find correlations in the data, which 
may infer causal relationships between the groups tested. 
4.4 Conceptual Framework 
To answer the research questions, a single set of passwords will be used as samples 
for experiments on clusters based on the 32-bit, x86 architecture and the 64-bit, 
AMD64 architecture. Each cluster will use both a dictionary and brute-force attack to 
crack the password samples, logging the time and password data for further analysis. 
This can be seen in Figure 4. 1 .  
Randomly Generated Password Samples 
32-bit Cluster 
Crack using a 
Brute-force 
Attack 
Crack using a 
Dictionary 
Attack 
Figure 4.1 Experimental Framework 
RESULTS 
64-bit Cluster 
Crack using a 
Brute-force 
Attack 
Crack using a 
Dictionary 
Attack 
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4.5 Research Limitations 
The time taken to crack individual password samples was collected during the 
execution of the experiments. However, these password samples were not originally 
gathered from a live system and therefore did not represent a real population of 
passwords. For the sake of comparing the efficiency of the password-cracking task, 
this lack of real passwords did not make a significant impact as each of the separate 
experiments used the same set of password samples. 
Another limitation imposed on the password samples was their inability to accurately 
model the different levels of password strength or complexity. Without a universal 
password strength metric, the strength of the password samples was based on 
researched factors and stated assumptions gathered from the literature review, such as 
the length of the password and the number of characters in the character set. The 
results from the experiments also aided in determining the accuracy of the estimated 
password strengths. 
The use of the LANMAN format of passwords can also be seen as a limitation to this 
research, as it has previously been seen as a weak algorithm for password encryption 
(Clark, 2004; Mudge, 1997; Saharan, 2003). The use of other common algorithms, 
such as the NTLM or MD5, could have been used for these experiments, but during 
pilot tests it was found that passwords encrypted with these algorithms took longer to 
successfully crack. To complete the experiments in time the LANMAN algorithm had 
to be used. 
The analysis of the results was based primarily on the time it took to crack each 
password. Other factors, such as the effect of CPU load, memory usage and network 
load, was monitored, but was not used in the analysis. This was mainly due to the lack 
of accurate monitoring performed on these sub-systems in an attempt to keep 
disruption of the experiments to a minimum. 
A final limitation to the experiments is the difference between the cluster hardware. 
Apart from the differences in processor architecture, each of the clusters was also 
different in memory speed, clock speed, network speed and disk speed. These 
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variations had effects on the experiments but could not be avoided. To minimise their 
impact, these differences were taken into consideration when discussing the results 
collected from the experiments. 
4.6 Experiment Design and Implementation 
To answer the research questions, tests were performed to measure the performance of 
the John the Ripper cracking utility when it was executed on two different parallel 
computing environments. The first two questions were answered by performing brute­
force and dictionary password attacks on both a 32-bit and 64-bit Beowulf cluster, and 
analysing and comparing the results. The third question was answered by attempting 
to discover trends or repetitions within the results from the experiments. To increase 
the reliability of the results and aid the answering of the third question, each of the 
tests were performed three times. In the end 12 tests were performed, 6 on the 32-bit 
cluster and 6 on the 64-bit cluster. This allowed enough time for the tests to be 
executed in a timely fashion. On each different cluster, 3 of the tests were the wordlist 
attacks, while the other 3 were the brute-force attacks. 
4.6.1 Experimental Variables 
To allow for a valid examination of the results gathered from these experiments it was 
necessary to define the different variables. This provided a description of what 
quantitative measurements had to be made, and what factors were to be modified for 
the experiment. 
The Independent Variables (IV) for the experiments were the different password 
attack types, either brute-force or dictionary, and also the different cluster 
architectures, either 32-bit or 64-bit. These two separate variables were changed for 
each of the 12 experiments, causing effects in the Dependant Variables that were 
recorded. 
The Dependant Variables (DV) for the experiments were the sample password hashes 
which were cracked successfully, and how long each particular hash took to crack. 
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These variables relied on the IVs, and changed accordingly when the IVs were 
modified. 
The control variables for the experiments were other variables which may have had an 
effect on the DVs, but were held constant to reduce their effect. These variables 
included the network bandwidth available to the cluster, the number of compute­
nodes, and the configuration of software. In particular, the John the Ripper 
configuration was viewed as a control variable, and remained constant throughout all 
the experiments. 
Confounded variables were other variables which may have had an effect on the DVs 
but could not be measured or controlled during the experiments. Some of the 
confounded variables that may have had an effect on the DV s include the background 
processor load for each of the compute-nodes, and the effects of processor and 
memory bandwidth. 
4.6.2 Password Samples 
The samples used for the tests were taken from two sources. These separate sources 
were chosen as a way to increase the diversity of the password samples. 
The password algorithm used for these tests was the Microsoft LAN Manager 
(LANMAN) format, which is the same format used for Samba-based systems (Blair, 
1998; Cox & Hill, 2001; Shaffer, 2004). This algorithm outputs a 128-bit password 
hash, which is generated by: 
• Truncating or padding the input plaintext password to 14 characters 
• Converting all the alphabetic characters to upper-case 
• Splitting the 14 character password into 7 byte halves 
• Using each 7 byte half as a key to encrypt a known string using the DES 
encryption algorithm 
• Each half will output an 8 byte cipher-text 
• Concatenating these two 8 byte strings to form a single 16-byte cipher-text 
hash 
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For example, to encrypt the plaintext password "udkoctlt": 
1 .  Pad the password with null characters, "udkoctlt ___ " 
2. Convert the alphabetic characters to upper-case, "UDKOCTIT ___ " 
3. Split the password into two halves, "UDKOCTI" and "T ___ " 
4. Use each half as a key to encrypt a known string with DES resulting in two 
cipher-texts, "B3C169 1825C5E40A" and "2F8799F2AF2C6B3B" 
5. Concatenate these two strings to form the single cipher-text hash, 
"B3C 169 1825C5E40A2F8799F2AF2C6B3B". 
The first source of passwords was acquired through an automated password 
generating utility, Automated Password Generator (APG) (Mirzazhanov, 2003). APG 
can use two different algorithms to create passwords. 
The first algorithm used by APG is based on the Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) on automated password generation (Federal Information Processing 
Standards, 1993), which was originally defined by Morrie Gasser (Gasser, 1975). This 
algorithm has three main sections, a unit table, a digram table, and the random number 
generator subroutine. The unit table defines each individual unit, or character, and 
also the rules for the units, for example, vowel rules. The digram table defines rules 
for pairs of units, and the juxtaposition of these units. The rules in this table are 
verified for each consecutive pair of characters in a generated password. The random 
number generator is used to produce double precision floating point values between 0 
and 1 .  Using the random number generator and the rules tables, the algorithm forms 
groups of units that are checked against the digram table for pronounce-ability. 
Unfortunately, this algorithm is believed to contain flaws that may allow attackers to 
narrow down the possible password space. Ganesan and Davies' ( 1994) research 
demonstrates that passwords generated with the above algorithm are usually grouped 
in identifiable areas, which implies that an attacker only has to attempt a certain area 
of passwords to find a successful match. 
The second algorithm that APG may use is a simple random character generation 
algorithm. This algorithm relies on four separate symbol sets to generate passwords. 
These symbol sets define numeric, upper-case, lower-case and special characters. 
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APG provides a mode option that allows the user to specify whether the generated 
passwords require each of the different symbol sets or not. Both the pronounceable 
and non-pronounceable algorithms of APG were used to generate password samples 
for the experiments. 
The final source of password samples was a representation of differing strength 
passwords as defined by the rules implemented in IBM's Lotus Notes and Domino 
(IBM, 2004) software and defined in detail by Williams (2001 ). These rules define a 
password rating from 5 to 14, where a higher rating signifies a password that is more 
resistant against brute-force or dictionary attacks compared to a lower rating. The 
factors that influence this rating include the passwords length, its fallibility to 
dictionary attacks, and its character composition. 
For these tests the rules used for the generation of stratified random password samples 
are as follows: 
• A password's rating is initially equivalent to its length 
• A password receives a 25% bonus to its rating for one ( 1) of the following or a 
50% bonus to its rating for two (2) of the following: 
o Mixed case 
o Number 
o Punctuation 
• A number at the end of the password does not count towards the bonus 
• An upper-case character at the beginning of the password does not count 
towards the bonus 
• Passwords that are based off a wordlist or dictionary receive a penalty 
(ibid, 2001 )  
Some examples for a password of quality eight (8) might include: 
• A password that contains at least six (6) characters and includes at least two 
(2) number, mixed-case or punctuation character 
• A password that contains at least seven (7) characters and includes at least one 
( 1 )  number and one ( 1 )  mixed-case character 
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• A password that contains at least eight (8) characters and does not include 
words from the dictionary 
( ibid, 2001) 
These rules were used in the tests to generate a mixture of samples, from randomly 
generated passwords to dictionary-based passwords, generalising relative password 
strengths from weak to strong. 
4.6.3 Implementing the Password Samples 
APG version 2.2.3 (Mirzazhanov, 2003) was used to create the pronounceable and 
non-pronounceable password samples for the tests, while a combination of APG, a 
random number generator and a wordlist file were used to create the stratified random 
password samples. For each of the three different types of passwords, 80 password 
samples were generated and concatenated into a plaintext file. 
80 passwords were generated for each of the first two types of password samples, 
pronounceable and non-pronounceable. These were generated solely by APG, 
producing 160 passwords ranging in length from 7 to 14 characters, 10 passwords of 
each length and type. 80 passwords were also generated for the third type of password 
sample, ranging from a rating of 6 to 13, 10 passwords for each rating. To sub-divide 
this sample further for each rating, 4 different methods were used for generation of the 
stratified random passwords. These methods are summarised in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Stratified Random Password Sample Breakdown 
3 
3 
3 
Randomly generated, lower-case passwords of a length equal to the 
rating without any numbers or punctuation 
Randomly generated passwords of a length less than the rating 
containing 2 of either: mixed-case, punctuation, or number. 
Randomly generated passwords of a length less than the rating 
containing 1 of either: mixed-case, punctuation, or number 
A randomly chosen dictionary based word of a length less than the rating 
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In total, 240 passwords were generated and stored in a plaintext file. Due to APG 
being used as the main method of generating these passwords, some of the main 
options are described in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 APG Options 
Algorithm (a) 
Number of Passes (n) 
This option specifies whether to 
generate pronounceable (0) or non­
pronounceable ( 1 )  passwords 
This specifies how many passwords 
the utility should generate 
80 passwords were generated with 
this option set to 0, the remaining 80 
were generated with this option set 
to 1 
For each different password length 
this was set to 10 
Minimum Length of This specifies the minimum length This ranged from 7 to 14  
Passwords (m) for each password 
Maximum Length of This specifies the maximum length This ranged from 7 to 14, always 
Passwords (x) for each password matching the Minimum Length 
value 
Mode (M) This option was used to specify This option was used to aid in the 
options pertaining to the different generation of the stratified random 
symbol sets available to APG passwords 
To generate the pronounceable passwords the following commands were executed: 
./apg -n 10  -m 7 -x 7 > apg-pron07.txt 
./apg -n 10 -m 8 -x 8 > apg-pron08.txt 
./apg -n 10 -m 14 -x 14 > apg-pron14.txt 
At the end these 8 text files were concatenated together to form a single file with 80 
passwords: 
cat apg-pron* .txt > apg-pron-passlist.txt 
To generate the non-pronounceable passwords the following commands were 
executed: 
./apg -a 1 -n 10 -m 7 -x 7 > apg-non07.txt 
./apg -a 1 -n 10 -m 8 -x 8 > apg-non08.txt 
./apg -a 1 -n 10 -m 14 -x 14 > apg-non14.txt 
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At the end these 8 text files were concatenated together to form a single file with 80 
passwords: 
cat apg-non* .txt > apg-nonpron-passlist.txt 
Finally, the pronounceable and non-pronounceable plaintext password files were 
concatenated together to form a single file with 160 plaintext passwords: 
cat apg-pron-passlist.txt apg-nonpron-passlist.txt > apg-passlist.txt 
To allow for different plaintext password files to be generated easily, the above 
commands were called from within a single bash script, which simply created the 
final apg-passlist.txt file. The bash script can be found in Appendix A and the 
plaintext password files can be seen in Appendix G and H. 
Unlike the pronounceable and non-pronounceable passwords generated above, the 
stratified random password samples were generated using the following methods: 
1. Randomly generated, lower-case passwords of a length equal to the rating 
without any numbers or punctuation 
2. Randomly generated passwords of a length less than the rating containing 2 of 
either: mixed-case, punctuation, or number 
3. Randomly generated passwords of a length less than the rating containing 1 of 
either: mixed-case, punctuation, or number 
4. A randomly chosen dictionary based word of a length less than the rating 
For the first method, 3 passwords for each of the 8 rating levels were generated, 
creating a total of 24 passwords. This was repeated for the next two methods, which 
both created 24 passwords each. Finally, the last method was used to create only 8 
passwords, one for each rating level. In total, 80 password samples were generated. 
To generate the passwords for the first method the following commands were 
executed: 
./apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m 6 -x 6 > quasi-one-06.txt 
./apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m 7 -x 7 > quasi-one-07.txt 
./apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m 13 -x 13 > quasi-one-13.txt 
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These commands were executed via a bash script that also output a single 
concatenated plaintext password file, quasi-a-passlist.txt. The bash script can be seen 
in Appendix B. 
To generate the passwords for the second method, it was necessary to determine the 
password length for each rating level, this information is summarised in Table 4.3 
where bonus characters were either a mixed-case character, numeric character or 
punctuation character. 
Table 4.3 Password Sample Lengths for Passwords with 2 Bonus Characters 
6 4 characters, including 2 bonus characters 4 
7 5 characters, including 2 bonus characters 5 
8 5 characters, including 2 bonus characters 5 
9 6 characters, including 2 bonus characters 6 
10 7 characters, including 2 bonus characters 7 
1 1  7 characters, including 2 bonus characters 7 
12  8 characters, including 2 bonus characters 8 
1 3  9 characters, including 2 bonus characters 9 
Similar to above, APG was used to generate 3 passwords for each rating, paying note 
to the fact that the rating levels 7 and 8 both required passwords of length 5 and rating 
levels 10 and 11 both required passwords of length 7: 
./apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m 4 -x 4 > quasi-two-04.txt 
./apg -a 1 -M L -n 6 -m 5 -x 5 > quasi-two-05.txt 
./apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m 6 -x 6 > quasi-two-06.txt 
./apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m 9 -x 9 > quasi-two-09.txt 
These commands were executed via a bash script that output a single concatenated 
plaintext password file, quasi-b-passlist.txt. The bash script can be seen in Appendix 
C. For each entry in this file, 2 characters were modified in one of three ways: 
1. Swapping the case 
2. Being replaced by a random number 
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3. Being replaced by a random punctuation character 
Christian Frichot 
To simplify the process a matrix was created which had rows for each password, and 
columns to signify which characters to modify and how to modify them. A Perl script 
was used for all random number generation while APG was used to generate random 
characters. The Perl script can be seen in Appendix D and the matrix can be seen in 
Appendix E. 
To generate the passwords for the third method, the same procedure was taken as 
above, but instead of modifying two characters in each password, only one character 
was modified. The only other change was the length of each password, having only 
one mixed-case, numeric or punctuation character meant that the passwords were 
slightly longer than the earlier samples. These lengths can be seen in Table 4.4. The 
matrix file used for character modification can be seen in Appendix F. 
Table 4.4 Password Sample Lengths for Passwords with 1 Bonus Character 
6 5 characters, including 1 bonus character 5 
7 6 characters, including 1 bonus character 6 
8 7 characters, including 1 bonus character 7 
9 7 characters, including 1 bonus character 7 
10 8 characters, including 1 bonus character 8 
1 1  9 characters, including 1 bonus character 9 
12  10  characters, including 1 bonus character 10 
13  1 1  characters, including 1 bonus character 1 1  
To generate passwords for the fourth method, the dictionary-based passwords, a word­
list composed of 40,532,65 1 unique pre-mangled passwords was used. Similar to the 
two methods mentioned above, the password length for each rating had to be pre­
determined, this is illustrated in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 Password Sample Lengths for Dictionary-based Passwords 
6 9 
7 10 
8 1 1  
9 12 
10 13  
1 1  14 
12 14 
1 3  14  
Due to the LANMAN algorithm not permitting lengths of 14 characters, the last three 
ratings all had lengths of 14. For each password length required, the word-list was 
concatenated into separate word-lists containing only words of the specified length. 
The following grep commands were used to accomplish this: 
grep -x ' . . . . . . . . .  ' large-wordlist > wordlist09 
grep -x ' . . . . . . . . . .  ' large-wordlist > wordlistlO  
grep -x ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' large-wordlist > wordlistl4 
The full-stops above signify how large the words that were filtered were. This method 
was used to generate only one password for each rating, therefore only ten passwords. 
Finally, the passwords generated with the four different methods were placed into a 
single plaintext password file, ordered by the rating levels from 6 to 13, containing the 
80 unique password samples. The plaintext passwords can be seen in Appendix I. 
After all the passwords were generated and concatenated into a single plain-text file, 
collaborated-passlist. txt, they needed to be converted into a LANMAN formatted hash 
file. This file contained the usemames, the user IDs, the LANMAN password hashes, 
and the NT LANMAN password hashes. 
The first step was to create a usemame for each of the password samples. The 
usemames were titled apgnonpronOl through to apgnonpron80, apgpronOl through to 
apgpron80, and quasiOl through to quasi80. To create these user credentials actual 
user accounts had to be created on a Linux system, to simplify this task a bash script 
was used and can be seen in Appendix J. 
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The next step was to use the smbpasswd command to add each of the usernames and 
passwords into the Samba system. The authentication details for Samba are by default 
stored in a separate location to the regular authentication details, residing in the 
/etc/samba/smbpasswd instead of the /etc/passwd file. The command to add these 
details into Samba's password file is: 
smbpasswd -a username password 
To ease the creation of each of the 240 Samba passwords a bash script was used and 
can be seen in Appendix K. 
4.6.4 Cluster Hardware 
To address the research questions, both a 32-bit and 64-bit Beowulf cluster were 
constructed. Both of these Beowulf clusters were designed around the concept of a 
single head-node connected to a group of compute-nodes by a LAN. The head-node 
served three main purposes, firstly as a means of communicating and controlling the 
cluster, secondly as a network file server for the cluster and finally as the node used to 
compile programs. 
Programs executed on the clusters are started from the head-node, but all of the work 
is done by the compute-nodes, leaving the head-node free to serve files and perform 
other administrative tasks. Due to the head-node having to provide file storage to all 
of the compute nodes, it is important that this node not only have fast hard disk 
access, but also sufficient network bandwidth. The differences between the 32-bit and 
the 64-bit compute-nodes are summarised in Table 4.6. 
This table shows that apart from the obvious difference in the hardware and operating 
system architecture, the 64-bit Beowulf cluster will also have faster processors, faster 
memory access and greater network bandwidth. These differences will be taken into 
consideration when making a comparison between results gathered from the different 
clusters. 
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Table 4.6 Differences Between the 32-bit and 64-bit Compute-Nodes 
1 800MHz 
SDR SDRAM DDR SDRAM 
1001133MHz 1800Mhz 
lOOMbps Ethernet 1 OOOMbps Ethernet 
lOOMbps Switch lOOOMbps Switch 
Single Processor Dual Processor 
Linux x86 32-bit Linux x86-64 64-bit 
Each cluster was built and tested using the same method. First, each of the compute­
nodes were acquired and checked for all required hardware, including, hard drive, 
RAM, video card, network bootable Network Interface Card (NIC) and processor 
cooling fan(s). The next step was to ensure that each of the nodes could boot into the 
BIOS, which is accomplished by simply powering each of the nodes up separately. 
Upon successful entry into the BIOS, the configuration was checked and modified to 
allow each node to boot without a keyboard and also to boot from the hard drive 
before booting from the NIC. This same process was performed on the head-nodes as 
well, except more attention was paid to the additional RAM and hard drive space. 
In the case of the 32-bit cluster, each of the 14 nodes were placed on top of each other 
on a bench in the comer of a private laboratory. Each node was then connected to a 
Baystack 10/100 24 port managed switch via CAT5E networking cable. The only 
other connection each node had was its power connection. The head-node was set up 
next to the cluster and had a monitor, keyboard and mouse connected to it, allowing 
direct access to not only the head-node, but also the compute-nodes. The head-node 
had one NIC connected to the Baystack switch, and another NIC connected to the 
public network of the university. 
To set up the 64-bit cluster nodes, both the 5 compute-nodes and 1 head-node were set 
up as individual workstations, with each machine having a monitor, keyboard and 
mouse. Each of the nodes were connected to a Netgear 10/ 100/1000 24 port switch, 
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which was also being shared by 6 other general purpose workstations in a separate, 
private laboratory. The final configuration of each of the clusters can be seen in Table 
4.7. 
Table 4.7 Beowulf Cluster Hardware Configurations 
256MB SDR SDRAM 1024MB DDR SDRAM 
Dual CPU 
On board 1 Gbps 
10/100 Switch 10/100/1000 Switch 
5 
-12124MHz -1 8000MHz 
3584MB 5 120MB 
4.6.5 Cluster Software 
To power the Beowulf clusters the Linux operating system was used. Not only is 
Linux the primary operating system used by most Beowulf clusters, but it is also the 
operating system that JtR was originally designed for. Other software that was 
required included an MPI implementation, a C compiler, software to create password 
hash files, and software to create random passwords. 
A cluster toolkit or distribution was used to aid in the configuration, set up and 
maintenance of the Beowulf clusters. The main goals of the distribution were to 
provide an environment that is easy to use and maintain, allows for quick distribution 
of software and to scale well. The Rocks cluster distribution (NP ACI Rocks, 2004) 
provides all the required functionality built on top of the Redhat Enterprise Linux 3 
Advanced Workstation distribution (Red Hat Inc., 2004) and was used for the 
Beowulf clusters. 
At the centre of the Rocks distribution is the MPICH implementation of the MPI. The 
mpicc, mpirun_dbg and mpirun utilities MPICH provided allowed software that 
utilised message passing as a means of parallel processing to be compiled, debugged 
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and executed. Any software that referenced the MPICH libraries may therefore utilise 
the send and receive calls, allowing nodes to communicate with each other. 
John the Ripper version 1 .6.37 was the primary tool for this research because it is 
released under the Open Sourced GPL license and also because of its abilities to crack 
many different types of passwords on many different types of systems, compared to 
the other utilities. An earlier version, 1 .6.36, had previously been modified to allow 
the brute-force attack to be distributed with MPI (Lim, 2004 ), but this older version 
can not be compiled for the 64-bit architecture. Therefore, the first modification to JtR 
1 .6.37 was to make it perform a distributed brute-force attack. The only other 
modifications that were required was to distribute the wordlist attack and to append 
timing information to the output. A summary of the software configuration used in the 
tests is listed in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 Beowulf Cluster Software Configurations 
Rocks 
Distribution 
Linux Kernel 
OpenSSH 
MPICH 
John the Ripper 
Cluster 32-bit Cluster: 3. 1 .0 
64-bit Cluster: 3.2.0 
32-bit Cluster: 
2.4.21-4.0. l .EL 
64-bit Cluster: 
2.4.21 -4.0. l .ELsmp 
0.9.7a 
1 . 1 .2 
l .6.37 
Used as the primary distribution of all the nodes 
in the cluster, providing a single parallel 
environment to be controlled and installed with 
ease 
The kernel used by rocks, the core files for the 
operating system 
Allowed secure access to the compute-nodes 
from the head-node, was also required by 
MPICH 
MPICH was the Message Passing Interface 
implementation used, this allowed software to 
pass messages to each other, and therefore work 
in parallel 
Performed the actual password cracking 
The Rocks cluster distribution was installed onto the clusters by following two main 
steps. The first step was to set up the head-node, and secondly, to allow each of the 
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compute-nodes to boot and install off the head-node via their network interface card. 
One of the factors of the Rocks distribution that makes this task so easy is its ability to 
automatically install the software onto the compute-nodes via the network. 
The only options that had to be set when installing the head-node included: any 
additional software disks, generic details about the cluster, disk partitioning, the 
public and private network interfaces and the super-user password. Once this was 
complete and the head-node was reset the insert-ethers program was executed, which 
allowed new compute-nodes to be added to the cluster. To add each of the compute­
nodes to the cluster they only had to be turned on. After each of the compute-nodes 
had installed their operating systems, the cluster was ready to be used. 
JtR had to have three modifications to be used for the experiments, one of which had 
been done in an earlier version. JtR had to be modified to perform distributed wordlist 
and brute-force attacks, and it also had to be able to output timing information along 
with other output that was recorded. 
The fust modification was to allow JtR version 1 .6.37 to be able to perform the same 
distributed brute-force attack as version 1 .6.36-mpi, which was originally 
implemented by Lim (2004). This was done by firstly determining the differences 
between JtR version 1 .6.36 and 1 .6.37, and then by applying those same differences to 
the 1 .6 .36-mpi version. This resulted in JtR version 1 .6.37-mpi, which could now be 
compiled for x86-64 architectures, and perform distributed brute-force attacks. Pilot 
tests were performed on both the 32-bit and 64-bit clusters to ensure that the 
modifications were successful. 
The second modification was to allow JtR version 1 .6.37-mpi to also perform a 
distributed word-list attack. This was done by modifying the function calls used by 
JtR to initiate and perform the word-list attack. This version of JtR was called version 
l .6.37-mpi2. Similar to before, pilot tests were performed to ensure that the software 
still worked as intended. These changes can be seen in Appendix R. 
The final modification was to allow JtR to output timing information along with 
successful crack information to the log files. To do this, modifications were made to 
41 
Optimising John the Ripper for a Clustered Environment Christian Frichot 
some of the logging function calls. The final version number of JtR was 1 .6.37-mpi3. 
These changes can be seen in Appendix S. 
4.6.6 Experiment Execution 
To execute JtR, the mpirun command was used to start the program on the Beowulf 
cluster. This command is used by MPICH to start all of the actual processes on each 
of the compute-nodes, and is usually done by sending SSH commands to each of the 
nodes in the machine file. Arguments to this command control how many processes to 
start, where to send standard input and output, and whether or not to run on the local 
machine. The arguments that were used during the experiments and pilot tests are 
summarised in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 Mpirun Command Arguments 
-np 
-nolocal 
-machinefile 
-arch 
-exclude 
-stdin 
-stdout 
-stderr 
<program 
arguments> 
IO 
-/machinefile. txt 
LINUX 
This controls how many processes should be 
started 
This tells mpirun not to start any processes on 
the current node 
This tells mpirun which file to pull the name of 
the nodes from, this controls which nodes to run 
a program on 
This is a different method to control which 
nodes to run a program on 
comp-pvfs-0-0:comp-pvfs-0-1 This is a colon delimited list of nodes NOT to 
stdin.txt 
stdout.txt 
stderr.txt 
and ./john 
be used 
This tells mpirun to forward all input from this 
text file into the program 
Similar to -stdin, but forwards all standard 
output into this file 
Similar to -stdout, but forwards all standard 
error output to this file 
The last argument accepted by mpirun is the 
actual program itself, including any arguments 
to that program 
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Arguments that were used by John the Ripper for the experimental tests and pilot tests 
are summarised in Table 4. 10. 
Table 4.10 John the Ripper Arguments 
wordlist.txt 
--rules 
--incremental LanMan 
<password file> Passwd 
If JtR is executed with this argument then it 
will attempt a wordlist attack, this 
argument takes a value which specifies 
which wordlist file to use 
When used in collaboration with the -­
wordlist argument, JtR will apply word 
mangling rules to each of the words 
If JtR is executed with this argument then it 
will attempt a brute-force attack, this 
argument can take a value which refers to 
options specified in the john.conf file 
The final option is the actual password file 
to be cracked 
The same procedure was used for all 12 of the tests, allowing the data to be collected 
reliably and easily. This procedure is outlined below. 
• Ensure no unnecessary processes are running on the cluster 
o This was accomplished by using both the cluster{ork and ps 
commands, allowing a ps to be executed on each of the nodes 
• Check the machines file 
o This file specifies which nodes the program should be executed on 
• Execute John the Ripper, outputting the standard out into the appropriate file 
• Once John the Ripper had finished, copy all the necessary files off the cluster 
to a workstation computer 
• Remove the john. pot file 
o This file is used by JtR to store all the passwords and hashes it has 
previously cracked 
• Recreate an empty john.pot file 
• Execute the clean_all.sh bash script 
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o This recreates all the standard settings, ensuring there 1s enough 
character-set files for each of the nodes 
The machines file used by the 32-bit cluster was stored in the home directory of the 
32-bit cluster, and contained 14 lines, one line for each of the compute nodes. The 
machines file used by the 64-bit cluster was stored in the home directory of the 64-bit 
cluster, and only contained 5 lines, but for each of the 5 lines ":2" was appended to 
the end to signify that the nodes had two processors. For example, a section of the 
machine file used in the 32-bit cluster might look like this: 
comp-pvfs-0-0 
comp-pvfs-0-1 
comp-pvf s-0-2 
While a section of the machine file used in the 64-bit cluster might look like this: 
comp-pvfs-0-0:2 
comp-pvfs-0-1 :2 
The two separate machine files can be seen in Appendices L and M. 
The commands executed for each of the tests are listed in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11 Experiment Commands 
Commands: 
mpirun -np 10 -no local -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --wordlist=mangled.lst --rules passwdfile > experimentOl .txt 
mpirun -np 10 -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --wordlist=mangled.lst --rules passwdfile > experiment02.txt 
mpirun -np IO  -no local -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --wordlist=mangled.lst --rules passwdfile > experiment03.txt 
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mpirun -np 10 -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --incremental=LanMan passwdfile > experiment04.txt 
mpirun -np 10 -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --incremental=LanMan passwdfile > experiment05.txt 
mpirun -np 10  -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --incremental=LanMan passwdfile > experiment06.txt 
Commands: 
mpirun -np 14 -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --wordlist=mangled.lst --rules passwdfile > experiment07.txt 
mpirun -np 14 -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --wordlist=mangled.lst --rules passwdfile > experiment08.txt 
mpirun -np 14  -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --wordlist=mangled.lst --rules passwdfile > experiment09.txt 
Commands: 
mpirun -np 14 -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --incremental=LanMan passwdfile > experimentlO.txt 
mpirun -np 14  -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --incremental=LanMan passwdfile > experiment} l .txt 
mpirun -np 14  -nolocal -machinefile -/machines \ 
./john --incremental=LanMan passwdfile > experimentl2.txt 
Each of the 12 output data files were formatted in the same way, containing the 
cracked plaintext password, the associated usemame, which half of the password was 
cracked, and the time it took to be cracked. It should be noted this data was a 
replication of what was also being logged by each of the processes as well. For 
example, with 14 processes running JtR, 14 separate log files would be created, one 
for each process. Therefore the final experiment log files contained the same 
information as these individual log files, except they were formatted slightly different. 
One issue that arose with the experiment log files was that occasionally it was not 
always clear as to the finish time of each node, especially as it was common for the 
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nodes to finish at different times. When it was necessary to determine the finish time 
for each of the nodes, the individual node log files were used instead of referring to 
the experiment log files. 
5.0 Experiment Results 
The results from the 12  tests will be summarised in four parts, one for each of the 
clusters and the password attack types. Each of the four parts will look at the 
consistency of results over the three respective tests, the number of full and partial 
cracks, the time taken for each of the full and partial cracks, and a look at the 
composition and number of passwords that were not cracked. 
5. 1 Results from the Wordlist attack on the 64-bit Cluster 
The results from the wordlist attack on the 64-bit cluster were gathered from the first 
three tests. Each of these tests were performed on the five node, 64-bit Beowulf 
cluster, with each node containing two Opteron 244 processors running at 1 800MHz. 
The average amount of time for the tests to be finished on this cluster was 4 minutes 
and 13  seconds. A detailed summary of each of the process completion times in 
seconds can be seen in Table 5 . 1 ,  where each node executed two consecutive 
processes, and a summary of other statistical properties of these completion times can 
be seen in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.1 64-bit Wordlist Attack Completion Times in Seconds 
266 246 248 
3 266 249 243 
4 258 243 249 
5 263 249 256 
6 261 25 1 242 
7. 263 242 252 
,8 261 242 245 
9 261 250 250 
10 260 244 249 
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Table 5.2 Statistical Properties of the 64-bit W ordlist Attack Completion Times in Seconds 
Mean Totals , ?: 
, · ,,· • , . ,, ' ' ,' , ,, ,, ' ,  , , , '.', 
246.7 
248.3 
252.4667 
247.5 
249 
252.8333 
25 1 251 242 
249 256 242 
253.6667 257.6667 247.3333 
In all three tests, the same 10 full passwords and 73 half passwords were cracked. The 
reason that only half of some passwords were cracked was due to John the Ripper 
taking advantage of the LANMAN format, which is composed of two smaller length 
passwords. The list of full cracked passwords is detailed in Table 5.3 and the list of 
half cracked passwords is in Appendix N. 
Table 5.3 64-bit Wordlist Attack Successful Password Cracks 
155 139 
2 0 
24 8 
10 3 
253 239 
105 89 
255 239 
257 241 
12  4 
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Figure 5.1 64-bit Wordlist Attack Successful Cracks 
Figure 5.1 shows that 50% of the passwords were cracked within 15  seconds, while 
the remaining 5 passwords were cracked over the remaining 3 minutes and 53 
seconds. 
5.2 Results from the Brute-force attack on the 64-bit Cluster 
The results from the brute-force attack on the 64-bit cluster were gathered from the 
tests 4 through to 6. Each of these tests were performed on the five node, 64-bit 
Beowulf cluster, with each node containing two Opteron 244 processors running at 
1800MHz. 
The average amount of time for the tests to be finished on this cluster was 2 days, 10 
hours, 39 minutes and 28 seconds. A detailed summary of each of the process 
completion times can be seen in Table 5.4 and a summary of other statistical 
properties of these completion times can be seen in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.4 64-bit Brute-force Attack Completion Times in Seconds 
2 1 1 930 21 1052 2 1 1568 
3 209925 210009 210449 
4 203470 203483 203204 
5 .  21465 1 214132 214258 
6 201626 201538 201 903 
7, 214324 215664 217637 
· 8 ··· 225 157 224961 224082 
,9 203419  204276 203232 
10 216788 214340 216820 
Table 5.5 Statistical Properties of the 64-bit Brute-force Attack Completion Times in Seconds 
2 2 1 1092.9 21 1263 224961 201538 
3;, 21 1280.2 2 1 1008.5 224082 201 903 
:. MeariTotals 21 1 167.2 2 1 1 077.8 224733.3 201689 
In all three tests, the same 231 full passwords and 9 half passwords were cracked. The 
list of full positive cracks can be found in Appendix O while the list of half cracked 
usemames and plaintext passwords can be seen in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 64-bit Brute-force Attack Passwords Not Completely Cracked 
ujeizdi 
raxobWa 
VukanOg 
tyicHej< tyicHej 
quasi21 pybwwtjd pybwwtj 
.. �11asi44 vsdTqhhy vsdTqhh 
quasi46 rgl>lesx rgl>les 
,,', , '..· :, ' 
q[tbroRt q[tbroR 
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Figure 5 .2 shows the full crack counts against time. The dotted vertical line below 
represents the 60% of passwords that were cracked within 3 hours, or 7,772 seconds, 
compared to the final 40% of passwords that took an additional 2 days, 8 hours and 48 
minutes. 
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Figure 5.2 64-bit Brute-force Attack Successful Cracks 
5.3 Results from the Wordlist attack on the 32-bit Cluster 
The results from the wordlist attack on the 32-bit cluster were gathered from tests 7 
through to 9. Each of these tests were performed on the 14  node, 32-bit Beowulf 
cluster, with each of the nodes containing a single Intel Pentium 3 processor operating 
at 866MHz. 
The average amount of time for the tests to be finished on this cluster was 1 hour, 59 
minutes and 28 seconds. A detailed summary of each of the process completion times 
can be seen in Table 5.7 and a summary of other statistical properties of these 
completion times can be seen in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.7 32-bit Wordlist Attack Completion Times in Seconds 
7489 7087 6980 
7430 7087 6980 
7430 7088 6981 
7430 7087 6980 
7430 7087 6980 
7430 7088 698 1 
7430 7087 6980 
7430 7087 6980 
7430 7087 698 1 
7429 7087 6980 
7430 7088 698 1 
7430 7087 6980 
7430 7087 698 1 
Table 5.8 Statistical Properties of the 32-bit Wordlist Attack Completion Times in Seconds 
7087.214 7087 7087 7088 7087 
6980.357 6980 6980 698 1 6980 
7167.214 7 165 .667 7165.667 7 186 7 165.333 
Similar to the wordlist attack performed on the 64-bit cluster, these tests cracked 10 
full passwords and 73 half passwords. The list of full cracked passwords is detailed in 
Table 5.9 and the list of half cracked passwords is in Appendix P. 
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Table 5.9 32-bit Word.list Attack Successful Password Cracks 
23 22 2 1  22 22 
243 2 1 1 206 220 2 1 1  
97 83 8 1  87 83 
7207 6876 6769 6950 6876 
2726 2604 2559 2629 2604 
7253 69 18  68 10  6993 69 18  
7304 6969 6861 7044 6969 
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Figure 5.3 32-bit Wordlist Attack Successful Cracks 
The results in Figure 5.3 show that 50% of the passwords were cracked within 4 
minutes and 3 seconds, while the remaining 5 passwords were cracked over the 
remaining 1 hour, 53 minutes and 22 seconds. 
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5.4 Results from the Brute-force attack on the 32-bit Cluster 
The results from the brute-force attack on the 32-bit cluster were gathered from the 
tests 10 through to 12. Each of these tests were performed on the 14 node, 32-bit 
Beowulf cluster, with each node containing a single Intel Pentium 3 operating at 
866MHz. 
The average amount of time for the tests to be finished on this cluster was 4 days, 16 
hours, 3 minutes and 43 seconds. A detailed summary of each of the process 
completion times can be seen in Table 5.10 and a summary of other statistical 
properties of these completion times can be seen in Table 5 .11. 
Table 5.10 32-bit Brute-force Attack Completion Times in Seconds 
47 1 106 470509 470749 
3755 17  375568 376336 
344337 34375 1 343918 
344210 34424 1 344252 
419 154 418647 422504 
472243 472 172 47 1 753 
427803 427772 428297 
467 149 467240 467936 
479030 478977 47905 1 
38681 9  387022 388029 
352050 352081 353 163 
350593 35 1475 35 1 155 
345 1 1 8  342589 343086 
Table 5.11 Statistical Properties of the 32-bit Brute-force Attack Completion Times in Seconds 
403 153 .6 399564.5 478977 342589 
3 403957 401599 47905 1 343086 
Mean Totals 403422.7 399703.8 479019.3 343295 
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In these tests, 227 full passwords and 13 half passwords were cracked. The list of full 
positive cracks can be found in Appendix Q while the list of half cracked usernames 
and plaintext passwords can be seen in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12 32-bit Brute-force Attack Passwords Not Completely Cracked 
#dt }L2x 
udkoctl 
ujeizdi 
raxobWa 
VukanOg 
tyicHej 
pybwwtj 
jxxccpk 
vsdTqhhy vsdTqhh 
rgi>les 
q[tbroR 
qFc-hdr 
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Figure 5.4 32-bit Brute-force Attack Successful Cracks 
Figure 5 .4 shows the full crack counts against time. The dotted line represents the 
60% of passwords that were cracked within 4 hours, or 12,820 seconds, compared to 
the final 40% of passwords that took an additional 5 days, 5 hours and 54 minutes. 
6.0 Discussion of Results 
6. 1 Comparing the Brute-force attack to the Dictionary attack 
An analysis and comparison of the results garnered from the brute-force and 
dictionary attacks was used to answer the first research question: 
1 .  Which is the more efficient method of cracking a sample of passwords on a 
cluster of computers running John the Ripper, a brute-force attack or a 
dictionary attack? 
The efficiency of John the Ripper was first broken down into different segments. For 
example, the number of passwords each attack successfully cracked, the time these 
passwords took to crack, the reliability of these successful cracks and the composition 
of cracked passwords. 
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Examining the results from the experiments would indicate that the brute-force attack 
was more successful at cracking complete passwords compared to the dictionary 
attack. On both the 32-bit and 64-bit clusters, the brute-force attack successfully 
cracked 95% of the sample passwords, compared to the 4% of password samples 
cracked by the dictionary attack. When comparing the 10 passwords that were 
successfully cracked by both methods it was revealed that on the 64-bit cluster, half of 
the passwords were cracked quicker by the brute-force attack, while the other half 
were cracked quicker by the dictionary attack. 
Comparing the equivalent tests on the 32-bit cluster revealed that the brute-force 
attack cracked 60%. of the matching passwords quicker than the dictionary attack. It is 
believed that network bottlenecks may have had an effect on these results, as not only 
did the compute-nodes have slower network interfaces, but the switch itself was also 
slower. Additionally, the 32-bit cluster also had a greater number of nodes, which 
may have led to even further contention for access to the dictionary file. These results 
can be seen in Table 6.1 where the quicker crack times are highlighted. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of Matching Successful Cracks in Seconds 
Even though the dictionary attack only cracked a small portion of the passwords, the 
time taken to perform these cracks and finish the cracking process entirely was much 
shorter than that of the brute-force attack. This was due to the speed at which the 
cracking process could encrypt and compare every value from the dictionary file. On 
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the 64-bit cluster, the wordlist attack finished after 4 minutes 13 seconds, compared to 
the 2 days, 10  hours and 39 minutes the brute-force attack took. Thus, it can be seen 
that even though the brute-force attack cracked 91 % more passwords than the 
dictionary attack, it took over 800 times longer. The results from the 32-bit cluster 
also showed that the brute-force attack, while cracking more passwords than the 
dictionary attack, took up to 56 times longer. Once again, it is assumed that network 
bandwidth bottlenecks were responsible for the extra time the 32-bit dictionary attack 
took. 
Of importance to the efficiency of password cracking is the point at which additional 
passwords start taking a longer amount of time to crack. This point was clearly visible 
in both the brute-force and dictionary attacks, as there is an ascertainable time at 
which the number of cracks start to decrease compared against time. Figures 5.1 and 
5.3 show that there was a drop in the number of successful cracks about 3% to 5% 
into the dictionary attack. During that time 50% of the passwords were cracked, while 
the other 50% were cracked in the remaining time. 
In the brute-force attacks, Figures 5.2 and 5.4, the point where additional cracked 
passwords start taking a longer amount of time is visible when the line starts to flatten 
out. In both the 32-bit and 64-bit clusters this point occurs around 3% to 4% into the 
tests, at this stage up to 60% of the passwords had been cracked. The remaining 40% 
of the passwords were then cracked in the remaining 95% of the time. 
The reliability of each of the tests was also important to the efficiency of the two 
separate attack types. If the results were not repeatable then it may be said that neither 
of the attacks were very efficient. In each of the 4 groupings of tests, the results 
proved to be reliable, where each of the individual results, on average, were within 
10.8% of each other. 
The researcher speculates that the results collected from these experiments were 
influenced by the use of computer generated password samples, instead of real 
passwords. It is believed that password samples taken from a real-system may not 
have been as random and complicated as those automatically generated because 
people generally choose fairly weak passwords to help aid memorability (Adams & 
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Sasse, 1 999; Schneier, 2000; Wood, 1996). It is therefore assumed that, had these 
experiments been performed on a sample of real passwords, the dictionary attack may 
have been more efficient in comparison to the brute-force attack. 
In answering the first research question by analysing the results from the experiments, 
it is important to note that there is a trade-off between the number of cracked 
passwords and time when comparing brute-force attacks to dictionary attacks. Due to 
the random methods of generating the password samples it may be seen that the 
strength of these samples was initially very high. Though the dictionary attack 
finished very quickly, it was only able to successfully guess the weaker of the 
passwords, that is, the samples based off dictionary words. Of the password samples 
that were cracked by both the dictionary and the brute-force attack, it was seen that 
the brute-force attack was able to crack all of the passwords that the dictionary attack 
cracked. In comparing which attack was faster, it was seen that both attacks cracked 
half of these passwords first. 
By only focusing on the first 4-6% of the brute-force attack, where 60% of the 
passwords were cracked, a fairer comparison between the dictionary attack and brute­
force attack may be made. It can be seen from the results that in many cases it would 
be more efficient to perform a short brute-force attack compared to the complete 
dictionary attack. Even though the process might take slightly longer, 2 hours 
compared to 4 minutes, the brute-force attack not only cracks all the passwords 
discovered by the dictionary attack but many more. 
6.2 Comparing the 32-bit Cluster to the 64-bit Cluster 
An examination of the results gathered from the 32-bit cluster and the 64-bit cluster 
was used to answer the second research question: 
2. Is there an increase in the efficiency of password cracking on a cluster of 
computers if John the Ripper is compiled and run on a 64-bit system compared 
to a 32-bit system? 
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Analysing the results gathered from the dictionary and brute-force attacks, on both the 
clusters, revealed that the attacks, regardless of cluster architecture had very similar 
characteristics. The main difference was that the times taken on the 32-bit cluster took 
longer, 1 hour and 55 minutes longer for the dictionary attack and 2 days, 5 hours and 
25 minutes longer for the brute-force attack. To offer a comparison of the order in 
which both the attacks cracked the password samples, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show both 
the attack types, but instead of having time in seconds the scale is in percentage of 
total attack time. 
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Figure 6.1 Dictionary Attack Comparison between the 32-bit and 64-bit Clusters 
This figure demonstrates how similar the order and manner in which John the Ripper 
cracks passwords with the dictionary-attack, regardless of what architecture or speed 
the processors are. The following figure represents the same information, except for 
the brute-force attack. 
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Figure 6.2 Brute-force Attack Comparison between the 32-bit and 64-bit Clusters 
Comparing the time that each of the different attacks took on the two clusters shows 
that the 64-bit cluster performed about 1.9 times faster when performing a brute-force 
attack and nearly 29 times faster when performing a dictionary attack. Similar to the 
results discussed in section 6.1, it is believed that network bandwidth bottlenecks 
were having an effect on the performance of the dictionary attack on the 32-bit 
cluster. The bottleneck did not have an effect on the brute-force attack because this 
task did not require much, if any, communication over the network. 
When comparing the speed of the individual processors, the ten 1800MHz Opterons 
against the fourteen 866MHz Pentium3s, and the cumulative speed of the clusters, the 
64-bit cluster should outperform the 32-bit cluster by at least 148%, in MHz alone. 
Ignoring the results from the dictionary attacks, which were limited by network 
bottlenecks on the 32-bit cluster, and focusing just on the brute-force attacks, the 64-
bit cluster still managed to outperform the 32-bit cluster by more than 148%. Some of 
the possible causes of the extra 42% performance may be explained by the faster 
memory access that the Opterons had, or extra processor cache, or because each node 
had dual processors instead of just a single processor. 
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Without taking cost into consideration, the results from the experiments would infer 
that the 64-bit cluster was more efficient at clustered password cracking, using John 
the Ripper, than the 32-bit cluster. Unfortunately, without having two nearly identical 
clusters, except for their software architecture, these results can only be used to infer 
the increased efficiency of a 64-bit cluster over a 32-bit cluster. 
6.3 The Application of John the Ripper to Measure Password 
Strength 
Analysing the reliability of the results produced by the experiments was used to 
answer the third research question: 
3. Can John the Ripper be used to reliably measure password strength? 
To determine if John the Ripper could be used as a tool to measure password strength 
depended on the utility to produce reliable results. For each of the four main 
experiments, three tests were performed. This was primarily done to reduce 
extraneous results from the experiments, but also to determine if JtR could repeatedly 
produce the same results for individual cracked passwords. By comparing the 
differences between the results acquired in identical tests the reliability of the 
cracking utility could be analysed. It is important to note that these comparisons are 
only applicable to successfully cracked passwords, hence the wordlist attack, which 
only cracked 10 passwords, has a smaller sample size. 
Comparing the crack time between the three tests in each of the four main 
experiments revealed that the mean difference between repeated cracks was 10.8% 
and the median was 5.2%, implying that the experiments did provide reliable and 
repeatable results. In some extreme cases each of the separate tests actually reported a 
0% difference between results. Looking at the other extreme, in a few cases the 
maximum difference between separate tests was up to 88%. This implies that in some 
situations John the Ripper may in fact not produce consistent and relieable results. 
These results are summarised in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Differences Between Crack Times in Repeated Tests 
13.2% 0.4% 7.4% 0. 1 %  5.2% 
66.6% 0% 0% 22.2% 
70% 88% 16.4% 5.8% 45% 
0% 0% 5 .6% 0% 1 .4% 
The results in the above table only reflect the difference in times taken to successfully 
crack a complete password. For example, in the wordlist columns, the sample for 
these values is only 10, while the brute-force columns are based off the 231 cracked 
passwords. 
From the above table it is possible to see where each of the different attack types and 
cluster types might be able to produce the most reliable results. The brute-force 
attacks, for example, appear to have the lowest mean and median values. This would 
infer that this attack, regardless of architecture, would produce very reliable results. 
Analysing the outlier results, especially the high maximum values produced by the 
64-bit cluster, would infer that this type of cluster, while being more efficient, might 
produce erratic results compared to the 32-bit cluster. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show this 
data in a graphical form. 
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Figure 6.3 Differences in the Wordlist Attack 
The above figure illustrates the percentage differences between each of the successive 
tests, for the 10 passwords cracked by the wordlist attack. Additionally, by plotting 
both the 32-bit cluster and the 64-bit cluster it is possible to see how the 32-bit cluster 
produced more reliable results. 
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Figure 6.4 Differences in the Brute-force Attack 
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Figure 6.4 Differences in the Brute-force Attack 
Similar to Figure 6.3, the above figure demonstrates the differences between the 
successive tests, but for the brute-force attacks. This figure illustrates how overall the 
brute-force attack was more effective at producing repeatable reliable results, in 
particular when being executed on the 32-bit cluster. 
From these results it is possible to infer that using the John the Ripper brute-force 
attack, it would be possible to determine a value, in seconds, to how long a specific 
password would take to crack, depending on how fast the cluster performs and the 
hashing algorithm used. Analysing the relationships between individual passwords 
cracked in a single test can also be used to support this. For example, Figures 6.1 and 
6.2 show that when not looking at a specific time-scale, JtR on different clusters still 
cracks the individual passwords in the same order, and the distance between the 
password cracks is also similar. 
The researcher believes that these results may be influenced by the use of the 
LANMAN hashing algorithm, as this algorithm does not use a randomly generated 
salt mechanism, which are used to add additional entropy to password hashes, and 
therefore for each plaintext password there exists only a single cipher-text password. 
In the case of MD5 hashed passwords, there exist 4096 different cipher-text 
passwords for each plaintext password, due to the salt. 
Furthermore, when analysing the order in which the third set of password samples 
were cracked, which were defined by the rules implemented in IBM's Lotus Notes 
and Domino software, it was seen that the comparative rating levels did not reflect the 
order in which they were actually cracked. For example, the order in which the 
passwords should have been cracked, according to the rating, was quasiOl ,  quasi02, 
quasi03 to quasi80. Instead the order was in no apparently discernible order, quasi28, 
quasi05, quasi03, quasiOl ,  quasi02, quasi16, quasi53, quasi07, quasi04, quasi43, 
quasi72 and so on. Similar to earlier findings, it is believed that the method by which 
the LANMAN password format splits passwords in half was responsible for these 
results. 
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Through the experiments, it was determined, in the case of LANMAN or Samba 
formatted passwords, that John the Ripper may be used to determine the strength of a 
password by providing a timing value. Furthermore, by using a cluster of computers, 
these timing values can be calculated more efficiently. 
7.0 Conclusion 
This research aimed to provide an analysis and comparison of the Open Source 
password cracking utility, John the Ripper, on two separate Beowulf clusters, utilising 
both the dictionary and brute-force attacks. Such attacks might be used more 
effectively by organisations to protect their password assets by using a cluster of 
computers, as opposed to a single workstation. While not providing an alternative to 
appropriate password policies and procedures, the use of cracking may augment any 
security measures adopted. 
To ensure valid comparisons, experimental research methods where employed to 
gather and analyse quantified data, between the two separate Beowulf configurations 
and the two attack types. The data recorded the time differentials taken by each of the 
Beowulf configurations and attack types across controlled password samples. To 
reduce bias in the samples automatic password generating utilities were employed. 
By analysing and comparing the results gathered from these experiments, the 
researcher has addressed the research questions asked by the study, namely: 
Which is the more efficient method of cracking a sample of passwords on a 
cluster of computers running John the Ripper, a brute-force attack or a 
dictionary attack ? 
Is there an increase in the efficiency of password cracking on a cluster of 
computers if John the Ripper is compiled and run on a 64-bit system 
compared to a 32-bit system? 
Can John the Ripper be used to reliably measure password strength? 
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In answering the first research question John the Ripper was used to crack the 
controlled set of passwords using both a dictionary and brute-force attack on both a 
32-bit and 64-bit cluster. The results indicated several considerations when comparing 
the two attack types, namely the comprehensiveness of the dictionary file, the 
available time period, the network bandwidth and the passwords composition. 
The tests demonstrated the time trade-off to perform a thorough brute-force attack in 
comparison to a thorough dictionary attack. Performing the brute-force attack on the 
64-bit cluster took about 800 times longer than the dictionary attack but cracked 90% 
more passwords. While the dictionary attack only took four and a half minutes in the 
same amount of time the brute-force attack had already cracked six times as many 
passwords. 
The dictionary attack limitations may be attributed to the method in which each of the 
compute-nodes competed to access the dictionary file simultaneously. In the case of 
the 64-bit cluster there were no issues accessing the dictionary file, but on the 32-bit 
cluster which had less network bandwidth, the experiments revealed that the compute 
nodes did not have sufficient access to the shared dictionary file. This resulted in a 
limitation on the dictionary attack, as the compute-nodes were unable to access the 
wordlist efficiently. The brute-force attack did not have these problems, as each node 
worked independent of each other, including the head-node. 
Thus when comparing the two attack types, it was determined that the brute-force 
while being slower to complete was more efficient at cracking a greater number of 
passwords without requiring a large amount of network bandwidth. In cases where 
machine time is at a premium and only the weakest accounts need to be found, a time 
limited brute-force attack would still be preferable to a dictionary attack. 
The second research question was addressed using the experiments to compare 
distributed password cracking with the John the Ripper utility between a 32-bit 
Beowulf cluster and a 64-bit Beowulf cluster. Analysing the theoretical performance 
benefit of the 64-bit cluster compared to the 32-bit cluster revealed that the 64-bit 
cluster had an approximate 148% benefit in processor speed. In both the dictionary 
and brute-force attack tests it was seen that the 64-bit cluster, even though comprised 
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of less nodes, out-performed the 32-bit cluster. On average the 32-bit brute-force 
attack took 4 days and 15 hours, across the same password set the 64-bit attack took 2 
days and 10 minutes, outperforming the 32-bit cluster by 190%. The time differential 
between dictionary-attacks was significantly more pronounced, from 2 hours on the 
32-bit cluster down to 4 minutes and 30 seconds on the 64-bit cluster. As seen in 
Figures 6. 1 and 6.2, both of the clusters cracked the passwords in similar order, the 
only differing factor being the actual time of the cracking process. From these results 
it is inferred that the 64-bit cluster was more efficient at password cracking utilising 
either the dictionary or brute-force attack, compared to the 32-bit cluster. 
The third question focused on the reliability of the results gathered from each of the 
password cracking tests. The research aimed to perform consecutive tests without any 
fluctuation in the results. These results revealed that the differences in crack time 
between different consecutive tests ranged from 0% to 88%. Even though the 
maximum value was quite high, the average difference over all of the tests was 
determined to be only 10.8%. It was also discovered during the analysis stage that the 
32-bit cluster produced more reliable results than the 64-bit cluster, both of the mean 
and median values for each different attack being lower than their 64-bit counter-part. 
It was also discovered that the 32-bit cluster did not exhibit the outlying results 
furnished by the 64-bit cluster. 
The results gathered from the experiments in regards to this research question were 
heavily influenced by the use of passwords encrypted using the LANMAN algorithm. 
This is obvious when comparing the LANMAN algorithm to an algorithm that uses 
randomly generated salts to provide extra entropy to cipher-text passwords. It is 
therefore inferred from the experiment results that John the Ripper, at least in the case 
of passwords formatted using the LANMAN or Samba algorithm, may be used to 
provide a time to crack value, in seconds, for any password. These timing values will 
obviously change depending on the speed of the cracking computer or computer 
cluster however each password will still maintain the same distance relationship to 
other cracked passwords. From this it may be possible to determine, per available 
computing resources, how long a specific password would take to crack. 
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From this study it is clear that further research into password cracking in parallel 
environments is required. Such investigations as to the effect of modifying , the 
Beowulf configuration should be addressed to determine if it is possible to 
indefinitely increase the number of compute nodes without adverse effects. Other 
investigations may focus on other configurations of the cluster to determine any 
limitations and possible improvements to network bandwidth. 
Likewise the effect of using different password algorithms in such research should be 
further addressed. Currently the experiments were limited to the LANMAN 
algorithm, while more current algorithms, such as MD5 or NTLM, might yield very 
different results. Also to increase the external validity of the experiments performed 
by this research, it may be useful to perform the same tests on password samples 
gathered from actual computing systems, a comparison between the results of this 
research, and results gathered from real-world passwords could offer further insights 
into password construction and weaknesses. 
With passwords still remaining the primary means of authenticating with computer 
systems it is very important for organisations to ensure that weaknesses introduced by 
insecure passwords are kept to a minimum. For this to be assured multiple methods 
have to be in place, such as password policies and password strength enforcements. 
By using password cracking utilities, such as John the Ripper, organisations are able 
to advise users of weak passwords, and therefore ensure they are following policy. By 
distributing the process of password cracking over a Beowulf cluster, the performance 
of this task may be greatly increased. While this type of audit may have once been 
seen as non-imperative, citing reasons of time or monetary cost, it may now be seen as 
a plausible security measure by re-using aging computer systems or only performing 
short periods of clustered password cracking. 
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9.0 Appendix 
A. Bash Script to Automatically Generate Pronounceable and 
Non-Pronounceable Passwords 
# !/bin/bash 
#Generate the Pronounceable Passwords 
bottom=? 
top=15 
while [ "$bottom" != "$top" ] 
do 
if [[  "$bottom" -le 9 ]]  
then './apg -n 10 -m $bottom -x $bottom > apg-pron0$bottom.txf 
else 
' ./apg -n 10 -m $bottom -x $bottom > apg-pron$bottom.txf 
fi 
bottom=' expr $bottom + 1' 
done 
'cat apg-pron*.txt > apg-pron-passlist.txf 
#Generate the Non-Pronounceable Passwords 
bottom=7 
top=15 
while [ "$bottom" != "$top" ] 
do 
if [[  "$bottom" -le 9 ]] 
then './apg -a 1 -n 10 -m $bottom -x $bottom > apg-non0$bottom.txf 
else 
' ./apg -a 1 -n 10 -m $bottom -x $bottom > apg-non$bottom.txf 
fi 
bottom='expr $bottom + 1' 
done 
'cat apg-non*.txt > apg-nonpron-passlist.txf 
#Concatenate the files together 
'cat apg-pron-passlist.txt apg-nonpron-passlist.txt > apg-passlist.txf 
exit 0 
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B. Bash Script to Automatically Generate the First Method of 
Stratified Random Passwords 
#!/bin/bash 
#Generate the Stratified Random Passwords for the First Method 
bottom=6 
top=14 
while [ "$bottom" != "$top" ] 
do 
if [[  "$bottom" -le 9 ]]  
else 
then './apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m $bottom -x $bottom > \ 
quasi-one0$bottom.txt' 
'./apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m $bottom -x $bottom > quasi-one$bottom.txt' 
fi 
bottom='expr $bottom + 1' 
done 
'cat quasi-one* > quasi-a-passlist.txt' 
C. Bash Script to Automatically Generate the Initial 
Passwords for the Second Method of Stratified Random 
Passwords 
#!/bin/bash 
#Generate the Initial Passwords for the Second Method of Stratified Random 
# Passwords 
bottom=4 
top=lO 
while [ "$bottom" != "$top" ] 
do 
if [[  "$bottom" == 5 I I  "$bottom" == 7 ] ]  
fi 
then ' ./apg -a 1 -M L -n 6 -m $bottom -x $bottom > \ 
quasi-two-0$bottom. txt' 
else './apg -a 1 -M L -n 3 -m $bottom -x $bottom > \ 
quasi-two-0$bottom.txt' 
bottom='expr $bottom + 1' 
done 
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'cat quasi-two* > quasi-b-passlist. txf 
D. Random Number Generating Perl Script 
#!/usr/bin/perl -w 
use Getopt: :Long; 
if ($#ARGY == -1) { 
} 
print "rand.pl: Arguments --max=number --num=number\n"; 
exit; 
srand (time A $$ A unpack "%L* ", 'ps axww I gzip'); 
my $maxlength = 1; 
my $numberofchars = 1; 
my $verb = 1; 
GetOptions ("max=i" => \$maxlength, "num=i" => \$numberofchars, "verb=i" => 
\$verb); 
if ($verb == 1) { 
} 
print "Your maximum random number = $maxlength\n"; 
print "Your maximum number of characters = $numberofchars\n"; 
print "Your random number(s) = "; 
for ($i = 1; $i <= $numberofchars; $i++) { 
my $randnum = int(rand($maxlength)); 
$randnum++; 
if ($verb == 1) { 
print "$randnum "; 
} elsif ($verb == 0) { 
} 
} 
print "$randnum\n";  
if ($verb == 1) { 
print "\n"; 
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E. Matrix for the Transformations of the Second Method of Stratified Random Passwords 
;�· � ',�: ·/�; ,�� .'. :.-�� "· tt.�r--;a,�--:.-�-�:����!;;··: �:i��:;t[.�:�-� 7�?���r�:�::::�-�Ir:r; :I:.::· );:.::·· .:·,�J'l��\;;11 • -i .. 1 ),-· � �  /U! £._,_'-i':l �. r-..... - "' "'}�/ � !  !! -"� , . � �  o J �  � .,,  , ; :::,'�· , ,  ! ::< , ill ,._ £ � �il ') t--. ! ;  -A�-< 1 r�'.f t§, 4c&;l,J �t- · .d� 1 r,� u 1 "',;c= , e r Cl'.¥'� �  � - ¥a.:l--�"')(';a · ft="'-'"� . , �..,,_ £", �"'M<:>!.'c. .;Aoh_,, 2" - �o·.��,'8 .lli".-- �- � "',,.,� '"��,�h,; � ,-.;  ..._ C!<'.�- "',�"""'�,.4,.:;R�i,'lc-.,C:..,,.._... ,=,.,Qg<-._�:bl:  A""' · !xil .-i = !II/: <" "'-''-""�  :;�.,,._ L.. s<:<S�M 
1 6 4 1 3 3 2 Case ( 
2 6 4 1 2 3 1 Case 2 
3 6 4 1 3 3 1 Case /\ 
4 7 5 3 3 3 1 + ! 
5 7 5 1 3 4 3 Case ( 
6 7 5 2 3 4 3 9 < 
7 8 5 1 3 3 4 Case 
8 8 5 2 1 1 2 1 Case 
9 8 5 3 1 1 3 Case 
10  9 6 3 3 3 1 & ' 
1 1  9 6 3 1 3 6 [ Case 
12 9 6 3 2 6 4 < 1 
13 10  7 3 1 3 4 # Case 
14 10 7 2 3 6 7 5 \ 
1 5  10  7 3 3 6 2 
16 1 1  7 2 3 3 4 5 = 
17 1 1  7 2 3 5 3 6 
18  1 1  7 1 3 6 3 Case /\ 
19 12  8 1 3 7 2 Case [ 
20 12  8 2 3 2 8 3 # 
21  12  8 3 1 4 2 - Case 
22 13 9 1 3 8 6 Case 
23 1 3  9 3 3 7 8 # 
24 1 3  9 3 1 2 4 & Case 
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* The Action columns specify which transformations to make to the two characters. 1 
is to swap the case, 2 is to change for a random number, and 3 is for a random 
punctuation character. 
** The Char Pos columns specify which character in the password will be 
transformed. 
* * *  The Swap columns contain the new character to be swapped into the password 
F. Matrix for the Transformation of the Third Method of 
Stratified Random Passwords -�- ·· .. -!., .. , ., ,,, .. .. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16 
17 
1 8  
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
' 
ID�[m, . , ' ,,  . ' ., • · 
. 
6 5 3 5 % 
6 5 2 4 6 
6 5 3 4 [ 
7 6 1 3 Case 
7 6 3 2 + 
7 6 1 2 Case 
8 7 1 3 Case 
8 7 3 2 @ 
8 7 3 6 + 
9 7 2 3 6 
9 7 3 2 ( 
9 7 1 2 Case 
10  8 1 4 Case 
10  8 3 1 
10 8 3 4 > 
1 1  9 1 8 Case 
1 1  9 1 4 Case 
1 1  9 1 4 Case 
12  10 2 5 3 
12  10 2 8 4 
12  10  2 7 2 
13  1 1  2 9 4 
13  1 1  1 4 Case 
13 1 1  2 1 8 
* The Action column specifies which transformations to make to the single character. 
1 to swap the case, 2 is to change to a random number, and 3 is to change to a 
random punctuation character. 
** The Char Pos column specifies which character in the password to transform. 
*** The Swap columns contain the new character to be swapped into the password. 
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G. List of the Automatically Generated Pronounceable 
Plaintext Passwords 
awEp$0w eagbykgow UlitByabOdd) 
inyejMi nawgUdTat EitNoFryShry 
nenecJu kolgigdun UvutPonemek{ 
prikecl vodyuwab- gikslfAykcio 
lykvop$ fuatCouvAd kikvowdugVol 
Lyflogl NoyWiddyid nashi3Quilri 
"SwonOk amAdFatlm, ReShenlp W af$ 
cagButt EkimQue4vo SocGiorthacs 
vadavVu Wadveildyi N akTiad_Knad9 
Quaurg6 ThuitLejvi tydldsonoagal 
udkoctlt nuocDarrya ZodofbokagCon 
TisGarHo duibUceid+ okabhi vaj Ofek 
merbagRu UdoutVatch pybredtugCom 
ujeizdio MaGreibeug druOgPorv;hog 
raxobWam Gradekeryut TylVedFavUds8 
Vukan0g4 diquanevPok narvalkyivDep 
vuildab7 CryecsApmul rirjEtyagsOrc 
evNadOz] tecyigifCir RicJifveyReun 
tyicHej< rodCufogNee frepBemutA wOn 
qualHayd udquikViem6 J oodN eicjeufOf 
epjukcewk knyujlutOt; shrabweevyirp8 
juttavrom yantekKuect dicGobCenrigaj 
vijbieng/ Miwrijyouv$ FiwagCackTidCy 
WecOcCapO jeevDochOwn Pofheefj acyid9 
cuifGuaqu LytCeHoubpar clurshattin0k5 
Shontudd! InibJ eadPhes BerjilinweOvdy 
gactaphetDeOr7 
FesEbravHeftAn 
H. List of the Automatically Generated Non-Pronounceable 
Plaintext Passwords 
y9YD,34 C}OyN-h"v !2t"Vjm-*FAH 
G{ !-RKg l%-J }y$kQ :' l zGRG@q>_U 
d$YuBE] VKO-$'AH& xYAP;PqV[lS2 
"K}9Bq5 [>+P_QK{/ tll2-d;cx<J; 
r6Sh/ws beCKU%wFKo wl+;-]YL+ap, 
2w1F>:c vz*Ho]%=X6 M4'p!  lfHp6-5 
] "Pjl'9 *5sw'CX8,5 h8Ai[&VGz41D 
wKE+?[3 UBQ$V/X;Mh B;qX{q?"c2Fu 
O;UXqOx PyjIPV{ qSj ;B[=-,ADCs2RT 
W&]y%t2 O/\H-'&Un3 rg@t!hu[R8?y\ 
C }mLO<kA B!VMGXIk&p )FP')%0{ yvZ'/ 
An8o67,M ' ! im#A l'/U +l9YMa?B.ex!j 
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]B**de,J PrGddm/'=P *04+,Uudql3(A 
UE4<zWUL S#3U}8-_)i Xdfv9 _HIEA_P; 
5$+y$&(< 80Wj=K7nM;# {okXtQ_E }jKvR 
f !nc0]g4 G<I% Vl6zGnn v8vTNY?OK)lli 
#dt }L2xr B#>$ZlxTcL) u4} _ -X=[K,c[H 
Y9X/'kPf %&G'laDatrt \n?drl$RD,xYA 
pYU9'*rx S:5_&QJMc,l VF*. l i-Ha }m5C= 
.HI-TU)t '$D[.A+Owwl L-;XzqB3+cCjst 
ZE\fBf?4R tm>I2\RO:t; ) IH-#q 1 [V5p:"o 
}Dsy%1qQ" [0/ek?[80@9 W.h46)e6H7Rk@ _ 
y9' ;n!Zj5 RlxwSV#Sllc  o !ysCba-Uqm%\s 
:/HyD/9"C nA'HEGes;Dk ;E7 !$R3 _6cBoOm 
0MreluCI7 !w@ } (d-C:K@ 1 @zQ+" !,\Fbl-K 
,b@j$g>Q] szG:q=ilR"U" v8EnL,Pao8xF-; 
C?[G+z3Blp27el 
Jbowv#Ril %;tCj 
I. List of the Stratified Random Plaintext Passwords 
maihkp ayUly fuhrlprjwyq 
muomi l Rofw zaoslonRr 
nylvco :eYhz oqzHjahrv 
xbbz% trapanasse5 fsuBdqhdz 
iwv6p uqoupbyai yl5=xjw 
cbe[e voiooxppy oslu6ut 
y(Yo tmsgnsgpv ln"rnlGj 
2wDt dq6obbi vooronderzoek 1 
"mDm q(xlbpj nkrnlsakakkay 
sfarinano vYmeisb lgkflzurhmvu 
afeoogy ;h&jqe wdstgbefltwy 
ijbsjai yp[nzR jwmp3cbtrd 
kdnfdkw ikzl z< yroauii4zd 
ujJgwo mesodontisms udkxpw2gvb 
v+vmez ilwzfwwcpl q[fbroRt 
iHywhn cwbrocfssu j3wavoo# 
!m+we iridrterba qFc-hdrh 
cu(Jg vsdTqhhy patrouilleren8 
eu<9m lbqgxznk vgqysjmjfibgo 
6omdamming rgl>lesx wvilfhconibgn 
pybwwtjd ol#Xruj lklwpsvrgouzf 
blnniepy ymxxz5\ elnpuak14jk 
jxxccpke w:leb:g xquEcanhrnnl 
vgDfnqg disserninator4 8aviehyuuko 
w@xkaef bkspgcsycpq xkaqu.iKb 
vchuf+f jtdudunnnqb avoryh.#h 
k&mLoxupl 
Buitenpolders6 
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J. Bash Script to Create the Linux User Accounts 
#!/bin/bash 
#Create the APG Non-Pronounceable User Accounts 
bottom=l 
top=8 1 
while [ "$bottom" != "$top" ] 
do 
if [[ "$bottom" -le 9 ]] 
then 
'adduser apgnonpron0$bottom' 
else 
'adduser apgnonpron$bottom' 
fi 
bottom= 'expr $bottom + l '  
done 
#Create the APG Pronounceable User Accounts 
bottom=l 
top=8 1 
while [ "$bottom" != "$top" ] 
do 
if [ [  "$bottom" -le 9 ] ]  
then 
'adduser apgpron0$bottom' 
else 
'adduser apgpron$bottom' 
fi 
bottom='expr $bottom + l' 
done 
#Create the Stratified Random User Accounts 
bottom=l 
top=8 1 
while [ "$bottom" != "$top" ] 
do 
if [[ "$bottom" -le 9 ] ]  
then 
'adduser quasi0$bottom' 
Christian Frichot 
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done 
exit 0 
else 
'adduser quasi$bottom' 
fi 
bottom='expr $bottom + 1 '  
K. Bash Script to Generate the LANMAN Password Hashes 
#!/bin/bash 
bottom=l 
nonpronc=l 
pronc=l 
quasic=l 
for mypassword in 'cat collaborated-passlist.txf 
do 
#AGP Non Pronounceable 
if [ [  "$bottom" -le 80 ]] 
then 
if [[ "$nonpronc" -le 9 ]] 
then 
'smbpasswd -a apgnonpron0$nonpronc $mypassword' 
else 
'smbpasswd -a apgnonpron$nonpronc $mypassword' 
fi 
nonpronc=' expr $nonpronc + 1 '  
#AGP Pronounceable 
elif [[ "$bottom" -le 160 ]] 
then 
if [[ "$prone" -le 9 ]] 
then 
'smbpasswd -a apgpron0$pronc $mypassword' 
else 
'smbpasswd -a apgpron$pronc $mypassword' 
fi 
pronc='expr $prone + 1' 
#Stratified Random 
else 
if [[ "$quasic" -le 9 ]] 
then 
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else 
'smbpasswd -a quasi0$quasic $mypassword' 
'smbpasswd -a quasi$quasic $mypassword' 
done 
exit 0 
fi 
quasic='expr $quasic + 1' 
fi 
bottom='expr $bottom + 1'  
L. 32-bit Cluster Machines File 
com p-pvf s-0-0 
comp-pvfs-0-1 
comp-pvfs-0-2 
comp-pvfs-0-3 
comp-pvfs-0-4 
comp-pvfs-0-5 
com p-pvfs-0-6 
comp-pvfs-0-7 
comp-pvfs-0-8 
comp-pvfs-0-9 
comp-pvfs-0- 10 
comp-pvfs-0-1 1 
comp-pvf s-0-12 
comp-pvfs-0-13  
M. 64-bit Cluster Machines File 
comp-pvfs-0-1 :2 
comp-pvfs-0-2:2 
comp-pvfs-0-3:2 
comp-pvfs-0-4:2 
comp-pvfs-0-5 :2 
N. List of Half-Cracked Usernames and Passwords from the 
64-bit Wordlist Attack 
2 0 An8o67,M 
2 0 
2 0 
2 243 .3333333 
2 1 .666666667 
2 0 #dt L2xr 
2 0 Y9xtkPf 
2 0 YU9'*rx 
JO 
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ammonpron20 2 0 .HI-TU)t 
ao1monpron2 l 2 243.3333333 ZE\fBf?4R 
aognonpron23 2 244.3333333 y9' ;n!Zj5 
aognonpron25 2 242.3333333 OMreluCI7 
apgnonpron28 2 0.666666667 %-J }y$kQ 
apgnonpron29 2 243.3333333 VKO-$'"H& 
apgnonpron3 1 2 0.666666667 beCKU%wFKo 
aoimonpron35 2 0.666666667 PyjlPV{qSj 
aognonpron36 2 244.3333333 O/\H-'&Un3 
aognonpron42 2 7.333333333 G<I% Vl6zGnn 
aogoronl2 2 0 TisGarHo 
aogoronl 3  2 0 merbagRu 
aogoronl7 2 242.3333333 vuildab7 
ammron l 8  2 243.3333333 evNadOz] 
aogoron20 2 0 IQualHayd 
apgpron21 2 0 epjukcewk 
apgpron22 2 0.333333333 1iuttavrom 
apgpron23 2 243.3333333 vijbieng/ 
aogoron24 2 242.3333333 WecOcCapO 
aogoron25 2 0.333333333 cuifGuaqu 
apgpron26 2 242.3333333 Shontudd! 
aogpron27 2 0 eagbykgow 
apgpron28 2 0 nawgUdTat 
aogoron29 2 0 kolgigdun 
aogoron30 2 247 vodyuwab-
apgpron3 1 2 0. 333333333 fuatCouvAd 
aogoron32 2 0.333333333 NovWiddvid 
aogoron35 2 l .666666667 Wadveildyi 
aogoron36 2 0.333333333 ThuitLejvi 
apgpron37 2 0 nuocDarrya 
apgpron39 2 0 UdoutVatch 
aogoron40 2 0.333333333 MaGreibeug 
aogoron43 2 0 CryecsApmul 
aogoron45 2 243 .3333333 rodCufogNee 
apgpron46 2 109 udquikViem6 
apgpron48 2 36 yantekKuect 
apgpron50 2 36.33333333 'ieevDochOwn 
apgpron5 1 2 247 .3333333 LytCeHoubpar 
apgpron52 2 2 InibJeadPhes 
apgpron60 2 14.33333333 SocGiorthacs 
quasi22 2 0 blnniepy 
quasi23 2 0 lixxccpke 
1quasi3 1 2 0 uqoupbyai 
1quasi32 2 0.333333333 voiooxppy 
1quasi33 2 0.333333333 tmsgnsgov 
lquasi41 2 0 ilwzfwwcpl 
quasi42 2 0 cwbrocfssu 
lquasi43 2 0.666666667 iridrterba 
quasi45 2 0 lbagxznk 
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lquasi52 2 144 jtdudunnnqb 
lquasi53 2 0.666666667 fuhrlprjwyq 
1Quasi54 2 0.333333333 zaoslonRr 
1Quasi55 2 0.333333333 oqzHjahrv 
1Quasi56 2 0.333333333 fsuBdqhdz 
1Quasi6l 2 3.666666667 nkmlsakakkav 
1quasi63 2 7 wdstgbefltwy 
1quasi64 2 l .666666667 jwmp3cbtrd 
1quasi66 2 l .666666667 udkxpw2gvb 
lquasi68 2 243.3333333 j3wavoo# 
1Quasi69 2 0 qFc-hdrh 
1Quasi75 2 7.333333333 xquEcanhmnl 
1Quasi76 2 243.6666667 8aviehvuuko 
1Quasi77 2 0.333333333 xkaqu.iKb 
1quasi79 2 0 k&mLoxupl 
0. List of Successfully Cracked Usernames and Passwords 
from the 64-bit Brute-force Attack 
1 1 1 868.6667 
63239.33333 
206 138.3333 
25434 r6Sh/ws 
108477 2w1F>:c 
215865 )"P" '9 
75036 wKE+?[3 
44137 O;UX Ox 
90936.33333 W&] %t2 
1 8 1209 C}mLO<kA 
17228.66667 An8o67,M 
149809.3333 ]B**de,J 
74524.33333 
49493.33333 
105582 
199474.3333 
19997 .66667 
1 16139.6667 
166726 
161476.6667 
18 1 199.6667 
123488 
58245 
59 
38069.66667 
1 8 1 3 12  
214250.3333 
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apgnonpron29 149534.6667 VKO-$'AH& 
ao1monpron30 1 12825.3333 [>+P QK{/ 
aognonpron3 l 16928 beCKU%wFKo 
ammonpron32 107578 vz*Ho]%=X6 
aognonpron33 21000.33333 *5sw'CX8,5 
aognonpron34 633 13.33333 UBQ$V/X;Mh 
ao1monpron35 45653 PvilPV{qSi 
aognonpron36 162846.6667 O/\H-'&Un3 
apgnonpron37 15033.66667 B !VMGXIk&p 
ao1monpron38° 210147 ' ! im#Al'/U 
aognonpron39 13843.33333 PrGddm/'=P 
ao1monpron40 1 885 10 S#3U}8- )i 
aognonpron41 80635.66667 80Wi=K7nM;# 
apgnonpron42 180915 G<I% Vl6zGnn 
apgnonpron43 1 1 1414.6667 B#>$ZlxTcL) 
apgnonpron44 691 82.66667 %&G'laDatrt 
aognonpron45 86952 S:5 &QJMc,l 
apgnonpron46 75 1 37.66667 '$D[.A+Oww1 
apgnonpron47 178967.6667 tm>I2\RO:t; 
apgnonpron48 102722.3333 [0/ek?[80@9 
ammonpron49 12377.33333 RlxwSV#Sll c  
apgnonpron50 57209.33333 nA'HEGes;Dk 
apgnonpron5 1 197386 !w@ }(d-C:K@ l 
apgnonpron52 86786 szG:q=ilRAUA 
ammonpron53 152544 !2t"Vim-*FAH 
ammonpron54 129670.3333 :' lzGRG@q> U 
aognonpron55 14573.33333 xYAP;PqV[IS2 
ammonpron56 164483 .3333 tll2-d;cx<J; 
aognonpron57 1072 1 1 .6667 wl+;-]YL+ap, 
ao1monpron58 1 17883.3333 M4'p ! ltHp6-5 
aognonpron59 64502 h8Ai[&VGz41D 
ammonpton60 1 34728.6667 B;qX{ q?"c2Fu 
aognonpron61 10883 1 .6667 ;B[=-,ADCs2RT 
ammonpron62 101 15.66667 rg@t!hu[R8?v\ 
aognonpron63 55 135 .33333 )FP')%0{yvZ'/ 
apgnonpron64 1 84903.6667 +l9YMa?B.ex!j 
aognonpron65 73620.66667 *04+,Uudql3(A 
apgnonpron66 8415.333333 Xdfv9 _HIEA_P; 
ammonpron67 154938 {okXtQ E } iKvR 
apgnonpron68 1 1 303.66667 v8vTNY?OK)lli 
ammonpron69 193966 u4} -X=[K,c[H 
aognonpron70 86205.66667 \n?drl$RD,xYA 
ammonpron7 1 1 87835 VF*. li-Ha }m5C= 
aognonpron72 56224 L-;XzqB3+cCist 
aognonpron73 107706.6667 )1H-#ql [V5p:Ao 
ammonpron74 22636.33333 W.h46)e6H7Rk@ 
aognonpron75 193893.3333 o!ysCba-Uqm%\s 
ammonpron76 1 3496 ;E7!$R3 6cBoOm 
aognonpron77 209794.6667 @zQ+" ! ,\Fbl-K 
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ao1monpron78 28028.33333 v8EnL,Pao8xF-; 
aognonpron79 1 88374.3333 C?[G+z3Blp27el 
apgnonpron80 34660 Jbowv#Ril %;tCi 
aogoronOl 7772.333333 awEp$0w 
aogpron02 60 inyejMi 
apgpron03 4186.333333 nenecJu 
apgpron04 1 8876 1.6667 lprikecl 
apgpron05 25 13.666667 lykvop$ 
apgpron06 192436.3333 Lyflogl 
aogpron07 44433.33333 "SwonOk 
aogoron08 34 cagButt 
apgpron09 879.3333333 vadavVu 
aoimron lO 328.6666667 Quaurg6 
apgpron1 2  2326.666667 TisGarHo 
apgpron13  8 merbagRu 
aogoron17  23.66666667 vuildab7 
apgpron18  295.6666667 evNadOz] 
aogoron20 107 1qualHayd 
apgpron21 1410.333333 epjukcewk 
aogoron22 40 1iuttavrom 
aogpron23 20 vijbieng/ 
aogoron24 10  WecOcCapO 
apgpron25 44.33333333 cuifGuaqu 
aogoron26 1 .333333333 Shontudd! 
aogoron27 257 eagbykgow 
aogoron28 91 .33333333 nawgUdTat 
apgpron29 524.6666667 kolgigdun 
aogoron30 1 1 56.666667 vodyuwab-
aogoron3 1  29 fuatCouvAd 
aogoron32 91 .33333333 NoyWiddyid 
ao1mron33 6.666666667 amAdFatlm, 
aogoron34 3529.333333 EkimQue4vo 
aogoron35 441 .6666667 Wadveildyi 
apgpron36 2 ThuitLejvi 
ao1mron37 99 nuocDarrya 
ao1mron38 62 duibUceid+ 
apgoron39 27 17 .333333 UdoutVatch 
aogoron40 32 MaGreibeug 
apgpron41 2 Gradekervut 
aogoron42 842 diquanevPok 
aogoron43 16 CryecsApmul 
apgpron44 35 tecyigifCir 
aogoron45 64 rodCufogNee 
apgpron46 4233 udquikViem6 
apgpron47 485.6666667 knyujlutOt; 
ammron48 27 1 vantekKuect 
apgpron49 1 27 1 .333333 Miwrijyouv$ 
apgpron50 1 1 1ieevD0chOwn 
aogoron5 1 47 1 LytCeHoubpar 
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ammron52 127.6666667 InibJeadPhes 
aogoron53 850.3333333 UlitByabOdd) 
ao1rnron54 35.66666667 EitNoFryShry 
aogoron55 1448.666667 UvutPonemek{ 
apgpron56 1 83.6666667 1gikslfAykcio 
aogoron57 250.3333333 kikvowdugVol 
apgpron58 6126 nashi3Quilri 
amrnron59 l I0.3333333 ReShenlp W af$ 
aogoron60 8 SocGiorthacs 
apgpron6I 2899.666667 NakTiad Knad9 
aogoron62 65 tydldsonoagal 
apgpron63 1 69 .3333333 ZodotbokagCon 
ao1rnron64 85.33333333 okabhivaiOfek 
aogoron65 1 33 1ovbredtugCom 
apgpron66 745 1 .666667 druOgPorv;hog 
aogoron67 1 84.3333333 TylVedFavUds8 
ao1rnron68 68.66666667 narvalkyivDep 
aogoron69 66.33333333 rirjEtyagsOrc 
amrnron70 1 894.333333 RicJifveyReun 
aogoron7 1 18 .33333333 frepBemutAwOn 
apgpron72 125 .3333333 JoodNeicjeufOf 
aogoron73 399.6666667 shrabweevyirp8 
arnrnron74 793.6666667 dicGobCenrigaj 
aogoron75 849 FiwagCackTidCy 
apgpron76 143.3333333 Pofheefjacyid9 
aogoron77 334.3333333 clurshattin0k5 
aogoron78 395.6666667 BerjilinweOvdy 
apgpron79 264.6666667 1gactaphetDeOr7 
aogoron80 26.66666667 FesEbravHeftAn 
tquasiOl 1 3  maihkp 
1quasi02 1 5 .33333333 muomi 
tquasi03 7.666666667 nylvco 
1quasi04 45 xbbz% 
quasi05 6 iwv6p 
quasi06 977.6666667 cbe[e 
quasi07 39 IY(Yo 
quasi08 0 2wDt 
quasi09 38.66666667 "mDm 
quasi IO  434.6666667 sfarinano 
quasi l l 93.66666667 afeoogy 
quasi 12 1085.333333 ijbsjai 
quasi l 3  605 kdnfdkw 
auasi 14  1 3  l .3333333 ujJgwo 
quasi 1 5  4343.333333 v+vmez 
quasi l 6  3 1  iHywhn 
quasi l7  1003.333333 !m+we 
quasi 1 8  953.3333333 cu(Jg 
quasi l 9  1035.666667 eu<9m 
1quasi20 2990.333333 6omdamming 
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quasi22 2235 blnniepy 
quasi23 1 1 16.333333 ixxccpke 
quasi24 1 376.333333 vgDfnqg 
quasi25 1 347.333333 w@xkaef 
1quasi26 80082 vchuf+f 
quasi27 1 326 ayUjy 
quasi28 3 l Rofw 
quasi29 360.3333333 :eYhz 
quasi30 0 trapanasse5 
1quasi3 1 723.3333333 uqoupbyai 
!quasi32 5050.666667 voiooxppy 
quasi33 61 14 tmsgnsgov 
1quasi34 1983.666667 dq6obbi 
lquasi35 12746.66667 q(xlbpj 
1quasi36 353 vYmeisb 
lquasi37 3004.666667 ;h&jqe 
1quasi38 4059.666667 IYP[nzR 
quasi39 8455.666667 ikzl z< 
quasi40 2 1  mesodontisms 
lquasi41 501 .3333333 ilwzfwwcpl 
1quasi42 1285.666667 cwbrocfssu 
lquasi43 6 1.33333333 iridrterba 
quasi45 129928 bagxznk 
quasi47 4814 ol#Xrui 
quasi48 87980.66667 ymxxz5\ 
quasi49 89853 w:leb:g 
1quasi50 3 disseminator4 
!quasi5 1 1036 bksogcsycoa 
quasi52 246.6666667 1itdudunnnqb 
quasi53 38.66666667 fuhrlprjwyq 
quasi54 564.6666667 zaoslonRr 
lquasi55 1 1 89 oqzHjahrv 
1quasi56 4844 fsuBdqhdz 
lquasi57 103450 lvl5=xiw 
1quasi58 1 57739.6667 oslu6ut 
quasi59 1 8778 lnAm!Gi 
quasi60 4749.666667 vooronderzoekl 
quasi6 1 612  nkmlsakakkav 
quasi62 2542.333333 lgkflzurhmvu 
quasi63 469.3333333 wdstgbefltwv 
quasi64 1 103 iwmp3cbtrd 
quasi65 573.6666667 yroauii4zd 
quasi66 646.3333333 udkxpw2gvb 
quasi68 723.3333333 j3wavoo# 
lquasi69 58946.33333 lqFc-hdrh 
1quasi70 355 1patrouilleren8 
lquasi7 1 2 138.666667 Vl!QVSimifibgo 
1quasi72 75 wvilfhconibgn 
lquasi73 753 lklwpsvrgouzf 
16 
Optimising John the Ripper for a Clustered Environment Christian Frichot 
lquasi74 449 elnpuakl4ik 
lquasi75 766 xquEcanhmnl 
1quasi76 1672.333333 8aviehyuuko 
lquasi77 4432 xkaqu.iKb 
quasi78 1 36 avoryh.#h 
quasi79 9727 .666667 k&rnLoxupl 
quasi80 4 18.6666667 B uitenpolders6 
P. List of Half-Cracked Usernames and Passwords from the 
32-bit Word/ist Attack 
2 
2 O ]B**de,J 
2 O UE4<zWUL 
2 6977 5$+ $&(< 
2 27.33333333 f!ncO] 4 
2 O #dt L2xr 
2 O Y9X/'kPf 
2 
2 
2 
2 6977.666667 ';n 1z·5 
2 6952 OMreluCI7 
2 16.33333333 %-J} $kQ 
2 6977.333333 VKO-$'AH& 
2 
2 
2 6977.666667 O/\H-'&Un3 
2 120.6666667 G< %V 6zGnn 
2 O TisGarHo 
2 O merba Ru 
2 6950.666667 vuildab7 
2 6977 evNadOz] 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 7 cuifGua u 
2 695 1 .333333 Shontudd ! 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 10.66666667 fuatCouvAd 
2 7 No Widd id 
2 23 Wadveild i 
1 7  
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ap_gpron36 2 1 5.33333333 ThuitLeivi 
amrnron37 2 7 nuocDarrva 
ap_gpron39 2 6.666666667 UdoutVatch 
ap_gpron40 2 9.333333333 MaGreibeu_g 
ap_gpron43 2 0 CryecsApmul 
apgpron45 2 6958 rodCufogNee 
apgpron46 2 3058 udquikViem6 
apgpron48 2 897 .6666667 yantekKuect 
aogoron50 2 905 jeevDochOwn 
ap_gpron5 l 2 7001 .666667 LytCeHoubpar 
ap_gpron52 2 37.33333333 lnibJeadPhes 
aognron60 2 25 1.3333333 SocGiorthacs 
quasi22 2 O blnniepy 
quasi23 2 O ixxccpke 
quasi3 l 2 O uqoupbyai 
quasi32 2 9.666666667 voiooxppy 
quasi33 2 10.33333333 tms_gnssmv 
quasi4 l 2 6 ii wzfwwcpl 
1Quasi42 2 2 cwbrocfssu 
quasi43 2 16.33333333 iridrterba 
quasi45 2 0 ba2:xznk 
quasi52 2 4157 itdudunnnqb 
quasi53 2 16.33333333 fuhrloriwvq 
1Quasi54 2 10.66666667 zaoslonRr 
1Quasi55 2 10.66666667 oqzHiahrv 
1Quasi56 2 7.666666667 fsuBdqhdz 
1Quasi6 l 2 54.33333333 nkmlsakakkav 
1Quasi63 2 119.3333333 wdst_gbefltwy 
1quasi64 2 24 liwmp3cbtrd 
1quasi66 2 23.33333333 udkxow2_gvb 
1quasi68 2 6976.666667 li3wavoo# 
1quasi69 2 01qFc-hdrh 
1quasi75 2 l l 9.3333333 xquEcanhmnl 
quasi76 2 6964 8aviehyuuko 
quasi77 2 7 xkaqu.iKb 
quasi79 2 7 k&mLoxupl 
Q. List of Successfully Cracked Usernames and Passwords 
from the 64-bit Brute-force Attack 
226722.6667 G{ !-RK 
1 18270.6667 d$YuBE] 
413397.3333 "K}9B 5 
23004 r6Sh/ws 
195881 2w1 F>:c 
351047 ]"P
. 
'9 
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ao1monpron08 1 10874 wKE+?[3 
aognonpron09 83565.33333 O;UXqOx 
ao1monpron 10  240208.6667 W&]y%t2 
aognonpronl 1 389946.3333 C}mLO<kA 
aoimonpron12  65298.33333 An8o67,M 
ao1monpronl 4 148652.6667 UE4<zWUL 
aognonpron15  128514.3333 5$+y$&(< 
ammonpron 16 1 83405.3333 f!nc0]g4 
aognonpron18 48094.33333 Y9X/'kPf 
apgnonpronl 9 207682.6667 1pYU9'*rx 
ao1.monpron20 350238 .HI-TU)t 
aognonpron21 308617.6667 ZE\fBf?4R 
ammonpron22 419456.3333 }Dsy%1qQA 
aognonpron23 1 86103.6667 y9' ;n !Zj5 
apgnonpron24 1 86602 :/HyD/9AC 
apgnonpron25 203.3333333 OMreluCl7 
aognonpron26 82257.66667 ,b@j$g>Q] 
ao1.monpron27 38988 1 .3333 C}OyN-h"v 
apgnonpron28 4661 19.3333 %-J}v$kQ 
apgnonpron29 246655.6667 VKO-$'AH& 
apgnonpron30 175778.3333 [>+P QK{/ 
ammonpron3 1 25919 beCKU%wFKo 
apgnonpron32 190 1 1 3  vz*Ho]%=X6 
ao1monpron33 50780 *5sw'CX8,5 
aognonpron34 103300.6667 UBO$V/X;Mh 
aognonpron35 5 1533.33333 PyjlPV{qSj 
ammonpron36 3 12365 O/\H-'&Un3 
aognonpron37 43728.33333 B !VMGXIk&p 
ao1monpron38 376097.3333 ' !im#Al'/U 
apgnonpron39 275 19.66667 PrGddml'=P 
aoimonpron40 396703.3333 S#3U} 8-_)i 
aognonpron41 1531 14.3333 80Wj=K7nM;# 
ammonpron4 2 351 614 G<I% Vl6zGnn 
aognonpron43 169241 . 3333 B#>$ZlxTcL) 
ammonpron44 73929 %&G'laDatrt 
aognonpron45 109701 S:5 &QJMc,l 
aog:nonoron46 166174.6667 '$D[.A+Oww1 
aognonpron47 292 1 1 7  tm>l2\RO:t; 
apgnonpron48 218255.3333 [O/ek?[80@9 
apgnonpron49 21 397 RlxwSV#Sll c 
aognonpron50 94164.33333 nA'HEGes;Dk 
aog:nonpron5 1 437 129 !w@ } (d-C:K@ 1 
aognonpron52 145210 szG:q=ilRAUA 
apgnonpron53 259848 !2t"Vim-*FAH 
aog:nonpron54 214566.6667 :' l zGRG@q> U 
apgnonpron55 41939.66667 xYAP;PqV[lS2 
aog:nonpron56 278863.3333 tll2-d;cx<J; 
apgnonpron57 1 87826.6667 wl+;-]YL+ap, 
aog:nonpron58 170989 M4'p ! lfHp6-5 
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aognonpron59 1 66474.6667 h8Ai[&VGz41D 
ao1monoron60 22447 1 .3333 B;QX{Q?"c2Fu 
aognonpron6 l 21 8070.3333 ;B [ =-,ADCs2RT 
aognonoron62 1 6492 rg@t !hu[R8?v\ 
aognonpron63 90785.33333 )FP')%0{yvZ'/ 
aognonpron64 334758.3333 +l9YMa?B.ex!j 
ammonoron65 149414  *04+,UudQl3(A 
aognonpron66 l 6799.66667 Xdfv9 HIEA P; 
aognonpron67 272652.3333 { okXtQ E}jKvR 
ao1monoron68 3 1099.33333 v8vTNY?OK)ili 
aognonpron69 380477.6667 u4 } -X=[K,c[H 
aognonoron70 201830.3333 \n?drl$RD,xYA 
aognonpron7 1  363890.6667 VF*. l i-Ha}m5C= 
apgnonpron72 101236.6667 L-;XzqB3+cCjst 
apgnonpron73 125287.6667 ) lH-#q l [V5o:"o 
apgnonpron74 38993.66667 W.h46)e6H7Rk@_ 
ammonpron75 33 1 728 o!vsCba-UQm%\s 
apgnonpron76 1 8569.66667 ;E7 !$R3 6cBoOm 
apgnonoron77 334633.6667 @zQ+"! ,\Fbl-K 
apgnonpron78 39650.33333 v8EnL,Pao8xF-; 
ao1monpron79 3 1 807 1 .3333 C?[G+z3Blp27el 
apgnonpron80 62335 .66667 Jbowv#Ril %;tCj 
ammronOl 12 168.33333 awEo$0w 
aogoron02 97 inyejMi 
aol!oron03 7638.666667 nenecJu 
aol!oron04 319104.3333 lorikecl 
aogoron05 8427 lykvop$ 
aol!oron06 328892 Lvflogl 
aogoron07 1 1 8294.6667 "SwonOk 
aol!oron08 59 cagButt 
aogoron09 1 62 1  vadavVu 
aol!oronlO  1025 Quaurg6 
aogoron12 7967.333333 TisGarHo 
aol!oron13 21  merbagRu 
apgpronl 7 57 vuildab7 
apgpron1 8  944 evNadOz] 
apgpron20 408 .3333333 QualHayd 
apgpron2 1 2492.333333 epjukcewk 
aol!oron22 75 iuttavrom 
aogoron23 48 vijbieng/ 
aol!oron24 1 1  WecOcCaoO 
aogoron25 3 1  cuifGuaQu 
arnmron26 2 Shontudd! 
aol!oron27 635.6666667 eagbykgow 
aogoron28 155 nawgUdTat 
apgpron29 1 142.666667 kolgigdun 
aogoron30 2107.333333 vodyuwab-
apgpron3 1  69 fuatCouvAd 
ao1mron32 1 54.6666667 NovWiddyid 
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apgpron33 19 amAdFatlm, 
ammron34 12820.33333 EkimQue4vo 
aogoron35 7 1 7  .3333333 Wadveildyi 
apgpron36 3 ThuitLeivi 
aogoron37 224.3333333 nuocDarrya 
aogoron38 165 duibUceid+ 
ammron39 2889.666667 UdoutVatch 
aogoron40 55 MaGreibeug 
aogoron4I 3 Gradekeryut 
aogoron42 1214.333333 diquanevPok 
apgpron43 23 CryecsApmul 
apgpron44 3 1  tecyigifCir 
aogoron45 1 70 rodCufogNee 
aogoron46 43 14.666667 udquikViem6 
aogoron47 13 15.666667 knyujlutOt; 
apgpron48 433.3333333 lvantekKuect 
aogoron49 2121 .333333 Miwrijyouv$ 
apgpron50 16.66666667 �eevDochOwn 
aogoron5 1  61 3.3333333 LytCeHoubpar 
apgpron52 l 82.6666667 InibJeadPhes 
aogoron53 1232.666667 UlitB yabOdd) 
aogoron54 55 EitNoFryShry 
apgpron55 2612.666667 UvutPonemek{ 
apgpron56 188.3333333 gikslfA vkcio 
aogoron57 3 15.6666667 kikvowdugVol 
ammron58 l 1 8 14.33333 nashi3Quilri 
aogoron59 20 1 ReShenlpWaf$ 
ammron60 IO  SocGiorthacs 
aogoron6 1 2930.666667 NakTiad Knad9 
ammron62 l 94.6666667 tvdldsonoagal 
apgpron63 265.3333333 ZodofbokagCon 
apgpron64 2IO okabhivaiOfek 
aogoron65 350 'ovbredtugCorn 
ammron66 97 12.333333 druOgPorv;hog 
aogoron67 184 TylVedFavUds8 
apgpron68 I08 narvalkyivDep 
aogoron69 l 36.3333333 ririEtyagsOrc 
aogoron70 4225.666667 RicJifvey Reun 
aogoron7 I 38 frepBernutAwOn 
aogoron72 33 l .3333333 JoodNeicjeufOf 
aogoron73 43 l .3333333 shrabweevyirp8 
aogoron74 1637.666667 dicGobCenrigaj 
an2:oron75 1234 Fi wagCackTidCy 
aogoron76 342.3333333 Pofheefi acyid9 
an2:oron77 796.6666667 clurshattin0k5 
an2:oron78 596 Beri ilinweOvdy 
apgpron79 500.6666667 lgactaphetDeOr7 
apgpron80 66 FesEbravHeftAn 
iQUasiOl 14 maihkp 
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quasi02 2 1  muorni 
quasi03 15  nylvco 
quasi04 105 xbbz% 
quasi05 1 3  iwv6p 
quasi06 205 1 .333333 cbe[e 
quasi07 1 26.3333333 IY(Yo 
quasi08 0 2wDt 
quasi09 63 AffiDm 
quasilO 384 sfarinano 
1quasil l 86 afeoogy 
quasi 12  670.6666667 iibsiai 
1quasi l 3  1324.333333 kdnfdkw 
1quasi14 1 1 1  uifawo 
lquasi15 1 1 1 38 v+vmez 
1quasil6 76 iHywhn 
quasi l 7  1062 !m+we 
1quasil 8 1 855.333333 cu(Jg 
quasi 19 1 706.333333 eu<9m 
quasi20 5777 6omdamming 
lquasi22 3029 blnniepy 
1quasi24 2 159.333333 vgDfnall: 
lquasi25 8678 w@xkaef 
quasi26 1 34786.3333 vchuf+f 
quasi27 31 1 3.666667 avUlv 
quasi28 5 lRofw 
quasi29 608 :eYhz 
1quasi30 1 traoanasse5 
lquasi3 1 1 17 1 .333333 uqoupbyai 
,quasi32 4604.666667 voiooxppy 
quasi33 5405.666667 tmsgnsll:ov 
quasi34 304 7 .666667 dq6obbi 
quasi35 23592 q(xlbpj 
quasi36 594.3333333 vYmeisb 
lquasi37 1 1 103.66667 ;h&jqe 
!quasi38 5645.333333 vo[nzR 
quasi39 19796.33333 ikzl z< 
quasi40 25.33333333 mesodontisms 
quasi41 1357.333333 ilwzfwwcpl 
quasi42 1983.666667 cwbrocfssu 
quasi43 101 iridrterba 
quasi55 178 1 19 bClll:XZnk 
quasi47 9 126.333333 ol#Xruj 
quasi48 205620.3333 1vmxxz5\ 
quasi49 1 17475.3333 w:leb:g 
quasi50 4 disseminator4 
quasi5 1 1772 bksoll:csycoa 
quasi52 45 1.6666667 litdudunnnqb 
quasi53 72 fuhrlprjwyq 
1quasi54 966.3333333 zaoslonRr 
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1quasi55 3784.666667 oqzHjahrv 
lquasi56 4074.333333 fsuBdqhdz 
quasi57 203628 .3333 IYI5=xjw 
quasi58 32572 I .6667 oslu6ut 
quasi59 33240 InAmIGi 
quasi60 8952 vooronderzoekl 
quasi61 852 nkmlsakakkav 
quasi62 2437.333333 lgkflzurhmvu 
quasi63 477.3333333 wdstgbefltwy 
quasi64 1750.666667 iwmp3cbtrd 
quasi65 1263.333333 yroauii4zd 
quasi66 I424 udkxpw2gvb 
quasi68 835 j3wavoo# 
quasi70 368.3333333 patrouilleren8 
quasi7 1 3465 yg:avsimifibgo 
1quasi72 219 wvilfhconibgn 
lquasi73 1536.666667 lklwpsvrgouzf 
�uasi74 737 elnpuak14jk 
lquasi75 1 1 8 1 .666667 xquEcanhmnl 
'quasi76 2446.333333 8aviehyuuko 
lquasi77 8270 xkaqu.iKb 
quasi78 357.3333333 avoryh.#h 
lquasi79 22509 k&mLoxupl 
1quasi80 879 .6666667 Buitenpolders6 
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R. John the Ripper MP/ Wordlist Attack C Code Modifications 
There were two separate changes made to the wordlist.c source code. 
Modification l : 
2 6 :  #include nmpi . hn 
27 : #include " ryan . h" 
Modification 2: 
2 19 : i f  ( ( ( line_ nwnber 
2 2 0 : i f  ( l ine [ O ]  
- 1 )  % mpi_p) = =  (mpi_ 
- - ' # ' ) 
2 2 1 : i f  ( ! strncmp ( l ine , " # ! comment " ,  9 ) ) 
2 2 2 : 
2 2 3 : i f  ( (word = apply ( l ine , rule ,  - 1 ) ) )  
2 2 4 : i f  ( strcmp (word , last ) ) 
{ 
2 2 5 : strcpy ( last , word) ; 
2 2 6 : 
2 2 7 : i f  ( ext f i lter ( word) ) 
2 2 8 : if  ( crk_process_key (word) ) 
{ 
2 2 9 :  rules = 0 ;  
2 3 0 :  break ; 
2 3 1 :  
} 
2 3 2 : 
2 3 3 : } 
The two additions to the code can be seen above in bold. 
id) ) { 
continue ; 
S. John the Ripper Timing Information C Code Modifications 
There were two separate changes made to the logger.c source code. 
Modification 1 :  
27 : #include <time . h> 
2 8 : # include <sys/times . h> 
2 9 : #include <string . h> 
30 : #include nmath. h" 
31 : #include n cracker . h" 
3 2 : #include "options . h" 
33 : #include n status . h" 
34 : #include 0 times . hn 
Modification 2: 
1 7 1 : void log_guess ( char * login ,  char *c iphertext , char *plaintext ) 
1 7 2 : { 
173 : unsigned int time = status_get time ( ) ; 
174 : 
1 7 5 : 
1 7 6 : 
177 : 
17 8 :  
17 9 :  
180 : 
int count l ,  count2 ;  
printf ( " %- 16s (%s ) (%u : %02u : %02u: %02u) \n" , plaintext , 
login, time / 8 6 4 0 0 ,  
time % 8 6 4 0 0  / 3 6 0 0 ,  
time % 3 6 00 / 6 0 ,  time % 6 0 ) ; 
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The two additions to the code can be seen above in bold. 
25 
